INTRODUCTION

The recent Franco-British summit held in London last March 26-27 has received broad attention owing to the scope of the agreements reached, embodied in a Joint Declaration, and to the official blessing of a new “entente amicale” between the UK and France. Energy, immigration, security and defence, finance markets or global governance have been issues about which France and the UK have agreed common positions, as the result of a “common analysis”. These positions would show both governments´ will to further a deeper and more comprehensive cooperation or partnership, as the Declaration puts it. This is reflected in the agreement to give a boost to key topics as G8 and UN Security Council reform, the European security and defence framework, energy or the signature of a new European Migration Pact.

This summit points to the dawn of new geo-strategic alliances within the EU around a number of defined interests, alliances parallel to the more traditional ones we have become accustomed to. The institutional mechanisms for political discussion, in an EU of 27 Member States, are somehow complemented by a more efficient mechanism, in terms of the smoothness in achieving results, as bilateral summits are.

Granted, these summits are not per se as new a practice in the functioning of the UE; at times they have provided the basis for new energies to integration (as is the case of the November summit of 1956 between Mollet and Adenauer which allowed the creation of a European common market through the signature of the 1957 Rome Treaty). We want however to underline the importance of this specific summit for the following reasons:

>First of all, the Franco-British summit would provide evidence of the difficulties the traditional Franco-German axis might be currently facing –an axis which the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has consistently portrayed as insufficient for modern Europe. The disagreements arisen with respect to Sarkozy´s proposal on a Union for the Mediterranean might further support this idea; these disagreements not only show different ways to exercise leadership and diplomacy, that of German chancellor Angela Merkel and that of the French president, but also different views on Europe.

>Secondly, and importantly, the exceptional nature of this summit must be understood within the present context the EU is undergoing. Once overcome –or put aside indefinitely – the constitutional crisis stemming from the reform process, after the signature of the Lisbon Treaty, the debate is now focused on the definition of the political agenda. That is, questions on the institutional architecture are leaving room to others having substantial nature which concern the policies that will gather European efforts in the coming years, in view of multiple challenges (such as the energy model, new security threats and, ultimately, the EU as a global actor).
>Moreover, and in view of the foregoing, this debate is all the more pressing given the uncertainty the new institutional architecture stirs, under which several institutional and government actors will compete for political leadership in the EU: the EU President, the national EU presidencies and so forth.
There are several, different views of Europe on the table and these summits have the advantage of generating momentum, of mapping out synergies regarding a number of priorities for the policy of the whole Union. That is: decision-making in specific areas is boosted, bilaterally, and, inviting other states to join, the debate is then reproduced in other fora with implications for international policies. In a nutshell, bilateral initiatives thus turn into multilateral questions. The remaining states many times end up giving their opinions on predefined options, therefore ruling out or curtailing space for other alternatives.

European security and defence

Moving into the analysis of some of the decisions taken therein, in the field of security and defence the Joint Declaration highlights in particular the development of European civilian and military capabilities for international crisis management. Insofar as civilian missions are concerned (the so-called rule of law missions, etc.), the Joint Declaration states that the role of the EU in this area shall be reinforced, both States committing to contribute civilian experts in order to meet the 2010 Headline Goals, whilst they call on others to make similar commitments.

Moreover, and using a language which resembles that of Saint Malo´s model, the document gives priority to strengthening European military capabilities in the broadest sense (EU/NATO) over core issues, more controversial, such as the future relations between the EU and NATO. In order to do so, France and the UK have agreed to go ahead and solve shortfalls with respect to military capacity in Europe, leaving their proposals open to those countries willing to contribute. Furthermore, strong attention is given to industrial defence cooperation, pointing to specific measures as the removal of investment barriers or common programmes. The latter point is consistent with the British vision, in particular, on the industrial market in Europe, not shared by other partners.

These proposals signal deeper political options, which we summarize as follows:
-the French intention to go ahead in the field of European defence, particularly during its next EU presidency, to some extent independently of the new Treaty´s ratification progress;
-that this progress towards a European Defence be made engaging the UK, an issue bearing strong political force, since that country has traditionally been reluctant to the idea of a European defence autonomous of NATO;

-that, accordingly, France takes the lead of the process, returning to NATO´s military structure (as announced at the Bucharest Summit), in an Atlantic Alliance which gives a more salient role to the EU and its ESDP.

The issue of nuclear energy

One of the agreements that has had more significance has been the Franco-British bid for nuclear energy. Included in the chapter on climate change and energy, the French and British governments have agreed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the nuclear programs through the exchange of information about the safety and waste mangement of this source of energy.

The importance of this bid lies in the ambiguity of the EU institutions when addressing the use of nuclear energy. While there is broad consensus over the promotion of the use of renewable energies (Proposal for a directive by the European Commission-COM 2008/0016- to increase the use of energy from renewable sources up to a 20% by 2012), the use of nuclear energy is still an issue left to national governments (European Council, March 2007). In this context, it is remarkable the Franco-British agreement on enhancing the use of nuclear energy within the energy-mix chosen by the European states.
It is clear, to conclude this analysis of the summit, that these statements notwithstanding, disagreements between both countries will continue, as is the case with the CAP. Nonetheless, it is also the case that personal affinity or sympathy among political leaders together with the definition of specific, shared interests may turn into specific strategies, which latter received the support or acquiescence of other European partners. Hence, and generally, it is important to closely follow the results of these summits.
We are witnessing the framing of the EU political agenda for the coming years –and also for some of current key questions of the international order.

1) In general, monitor and assess the scenarios these partnerships may lead to, given their importance for future policies in the EU, judging whether to sign in for the specific proposals which may be launched.

This idea is particularly applicable with respect to European security and defence, a field where Spain can and must play a prominent role, in view of the initiatives now put forward and which may be implemented during the French EU presidency. In the same vein, the objective of the French presidency of adopting decisions on the energy plan for the EU, such as programmes for the capture and storage of CO2 emissions, requires the development of specific technical proposals by Spain.

2) Consider other possible alliances in the new EU, aside from our traditional partners, thus setting forth new strategic priorities in key matters of the kind exposed throughout this Memorandum. That is, create like partnerships with other European States, based upon similar interests and analysis. Specifically, in the domain of energy and in accordance with the foregoing, if the new Spanish government finally decides to opt out of the Europe of nuclear energy (which, as the Franco-British summit ushers in, will be led by France and the UK), Spain must spearhead an alternative energy framework.

The latter is a field where cooperation with Germany regarding renewable energies proves essential and must be deepened. Both countries share the interest for furthering the use of renewable energies in order to diversify and guarantee energy supply; they lead wind and sunpower in Europe and have already begun to develop common positions through the International Feed-in Cooperation initiative. The IFC, the object of which being to share experiences and coordinate stances in a number of issues (fixed prices for the said energies, etc), must be given greater visibility and be opened to other Member States.

Proceeding with such initiatives would not be incompatible with but would rather be additional to other options in Europe currently advocated for. It would also prevent giving priority to some over the others.

3) Advocate for the inclusion or association of our country in international fora different to the ones bestowed with a formal institutional architecture. A variety of reasons points to the inclusion of Spain in a broadened G8 group. Economic development, geopolitical relevance and the active participation of Spain in international fora (for instance, Spain is the eighth-largest contributor to the UN budget and is seventh by the amount of development aid, ahead of Italy and Canada) are factors backing the Spanish membership.
These fora discuss global questions, as political economy, energy, climate change or international security. The informal nature and the absence of common institutions of these fora does not diminish their relevance since, firstly, the countries taking part therein have enormous leverage in the realm of international institutions and, secondly, the limited number of participants enables discussion and adoption of agreements.

4) Ultimately, the idea is that Spain must provide itself with a strategy, a sort of Road Map for post-Lisbon Europe, comprising the several dimensions briefly mentioned in this Memorandum, and which shall be crucial for European policies in the near future. A solid strategy, with a set of priorities and partners to carry it out. That would give more influence to Spain and would prevent that our interests are not duly taken into account.

The urgency of such a strategy, bearing in mind the context described, is even greater in view of a Spanish presidency of the EU which will take place under a new institutional framework.