The UN-backed NATO operation in Libya seems to have lost steam. The rebels’ disorganization, America’s half-hearted attitude and European shortages in precision-guided strike capabilities are, arguably, the most visible reasons behind the current impasse. But this is Europe’s thing. And there is a deeper problem: Europe’s political aversion to challenging a water-tight international consensus, policed by Russia and others – who have already repeatedly accused NATO of going beyond the UN mandate. The fixation with protecting the consensus (fuelled by the bad experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan) is animating the belief that a deal must be cut with Gaddafi and his people. It’s as if Gaddafi’s ability to hold his ground had reminded many why he was the West’s friend in the first place. After all, the newly emerging consensus goes, stability comes first. But what kind of stability are we talking about? Isn’t the man who is now portrayed as indispensable to any political exit to the Libyan crisis the same ruthless murderer of civilians of two months ago?

The objective of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was to protect civilians from being massacred. And the Tripoli regime poses an endemic threat to civilians: yesterday, today and tomorrow. The only way to protect the Libyan people is through regime change. The alternative scenarios are a partition of Libya, with the creation of Western protectorate in the east (which would violate the principle of territorial integrity and cost Europeans more money and headaches in the long run) or packing up and going home, allowing Gaddafi to return – likely leading to retribution against civilians in Libya as well as the interests of Europeans. But there is also the always recurring third way: give diplomacy a chance. A win-win deal, the ‘sophisticated’ diplomat goes, would see Gaddafi go, integrate the rebels within the remaining elements of the old regime and spare Europeans of the political and financial costs of an escalation. Gaddafi’s personal future is not the main thing here, for the politics of Western countries already make it difficult enough to give him and his family a ‘honourable’ exit, although that would be the easiest way out –the diplomat insists.

However, this point is critical: Gaddafi is the head of the Tripoli regime, and his departure is important not only for symbolic purposes, but it is the broader power balance underpinning him that is responsible for the conditions that underpinned the intervention in the first place. And why would any elements of the Tripoli regime accept a deal if they feel that Europeans do not have what it takes to see through the end of the operation? They wouldn’t. There is a limit to diplomatic sophistication: unless supported by ongoing military pressure, the diplomat can only try to spin a loss (the continuity of the power structure which sustained Gaddafi) as a win (change: Gaddafi is gone!). This means that there is only one way: forward.

So, to believe that the present resolution can be enforced with anything short of regime change is simply delusional. And not carrying through with an explicit Security Council pronunciation after military deployment would lead to the collapse of the United Nations credibility, let alone that of Europeans in their own neighbourhood). The question is not whether to change or not to change the regime, but how to do so. The catch is that UN Security Council Resolution 1973 explicitly forbids ‘occupation forces’, and Europeans will not explicitly confront the no ‘occupation forces’ caveat.

Indeed, for political, legal, financial and strategic reasons it is prudent for Europeans to stay off the ground front line and continue to play a rebel-enabling role. It is this philosophy that has determined the mechanics of their military engagement so far, and particularly their concentration on air strikes and their stated aversion to a full invasion. But Resolution 1973 denies a full occupation, not any type of ground engagement. So long as they don’t leave the current approach of acting as strategic enablers of the rebels’ military capability, Europeans have plenty of room for moving forward holding the rebels in one hand and the UN on the other.

The question is how to tighten the grip on Tripoli without crossing the ‘occupation Rubicon. Recent calls by British Defence Secretary Liam Fox for an intensification of the air campaign to target the broader infrastructure propping up the regime should be welcome. The dispatch of military officers from Britain, France and Italy to liaise with the rebels should also be intensified, to cover also training, arming and assistance with command, control and communication systems. So should recent Franco-British calls to dispatch attack helicopters be welcome as a way to tighten the grip on the Gaddafi regime and give the rebels a closer cover. But Europeans can and should do more. Indeed, the rebels’ repel of Gaddafi’s forces from Misurata gives the EU an opportunity to launch the planned CSDP humanitarian mission in a city still under threat. Aside from bringing humanitarian relief, the EU mission would serve to hold a city of vital tactical military value, thereby providing a key enabling effect on the rebels’ strategic capability. As a strong advocate of CSDP, and having a strong interest in Europe’s control over his southern neighbourhood, Spain should support that.