

# **The goals of Spain in its Foreign Action**

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## **Coordination and chief writer**

**Nicolás Sartorius**, Director of Opex and Executive Vice-Chairman of the Fundación Alternativas.

## **Adaptation and Co-writer**

**Vicente Palacio**, Deputy director of Opex.

## **The following people have contributed to the writing of this document**

**Joaquín Arango**, UCM professor (Immigration).

**Rafael Bustos**, Opex Coordinator for the Maghreb and Middle East.

**Katty Cascante**, Opex Coordinator for Development Cooperation.

**Mario Esteban**, Opex coordinator for the Asia-Pacific Region.

**Mariano Marzo**, Member of the Opex Advisory Board (Energy).

**Ignacio Molina**, Opex Coordinator for Europe.

**Vicente Palacio**, Deputy Director of Opex and Coordinator for Transatlantic Relations.

**Manuel de la Rocha Vázquez**, Opex Coordinator for sub-Saharan Africa.

**Ángeles Sánchez**, Opex Coordinator for Latin America.

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**Abbreviations**

AECID	Spain's Agency for Cooperation and Development
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNI	National Intelligence Centre of Spain
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

# Introduction

This document contains the basic approaches and courses of action for Spanish foreign action in the medium term, that is, in the course of two periods of office or a decade. Our country has come to occupy a prominent position in the short space of time of three decades, but Spain still has considerable potential for further progress. To achieve that, it is necessary that this and successive governments undertake a serious reconsideration of what the focal point of Spain's foreign action must be, jettisoning a strictly "national" or "state" conception of policy and giving way to another more open and global view.

Our political path in the 21st century must begin from the confirmation that the old distinction between "domestic policy" and "foreign policy" has blurred. This is the result of both globalization and of our recent political, social and economic evolution, which has brought to the fore new players with international projection: Spain's autonomous communities, companies, social players. This complex conglomeration of new players and interdependent policies, which here we have called foreign action, has done away with the traditional conception of foreign policy –especially in a country like Spain, where most of public policy has been devolved to the autonomous communities. Globalization combined with political decentralization require a new view of foreign action as a central activity of the state.

Spain cannot be distracted from what are the basic, strategic issues of its development and welfare, nor can it afford to allow its political life to be hijacked by controversies which do not consider the general good of the state. We suffer from a dangerous gap between the relatively major position we occupy at a world level and the self-absorption of our political debate; between the vital issues of our development and

distraction with other matters of party confrontation which count for little; between a high-quality political vision in the medium and long term and one that is local-looking and deals only with the short term. It is not a matter of wishing for total consensus among political parties, which is no longer possible, rather one of seeing that those basic issues, such as our cultural and political projection, the role of our armed forces, immigrants, the environment, energy supply, our companies, the fight against terrorism or our image as a country, are not “domestic” or “foreign” issues: they are simply elements of a single, all-embracing policy.

The current government is making a considerable effort in some areas such as cooperation and, at a difficult time for the European Union, is trying to find its place in the world. It has launched several initiatives that are on the right track. Now it is necessary to afford them continuity, but it is also urgent to give our foreign action greater strategic vision and launch more and better initiatives, with the human and material resources required to lead and anticipate the future.

Spain has trodden a successful path in the last 30 years, but the country has changed and the world has too. We can be assured of nothing and that is why the temptation to rest on our laurels poses a major threat. Now, with its new weight in the world, Spain must fight to achieve an advantageous position in globalization based on a firm stance within Europe. But being in globalization does not come free. It requires political leadership and farsightedness. Recognizing this new scenario and knowing how to bring it to the fore with the determination to mobilize an entire society is the art of politics.

This document identifies what we understand to be the main lines of foreign action in the different thematic, transversal and geographic areas; it marks out the main plans of action for each one of them and justifies their importance to the future of our country. Spain is staking its future precisely on that area of intersection between “domestic” and “foreign” policies. It is necessary to become aware of this new reality, change policies accordingly and transmit this new reality to citizens.

The governments and societies of advanced countries, capable of understanding this better and acting accordingly, are those which will best secure their welfare and their development in the 21st century. On the other hand, those which do not carry out that conceptual revolution of a global scope will fall behind.

# 1. General framework

## 1.1 Domestic framework

The goals to be considered by Spain in its foreign action in the medium term are inseparable from –even if they are not the same as– our aspirations as a country, or to put it another way, they must depend on the model of national community that we wish to construct, working on three basic premises: that Spain is a plural nation with a federal structure; that Spain forms part of the European Union and that Spain moves in an area of global interests located between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, Eurasia and Africa, America and Europe.

The supreme interest of Spanish society is to maintain internal peace and be a factor and player in pacification abroad, within a global framework. It has been some time since Spain had either territorial designs or the desire for dominions or border disputes with other nations, except those that could be derived from the traditional claim on the part of Morocco over the cities of Ceuta and Melilla and on the part of Spain over Gibraltar. Spanish citizens have come out in force to show that on no account do they wish to be involved in situations of war which do not contribute to the pacification of other countries and that intervention must always take place within the framework of decisions taken by the UN.

The internal solidity of a country is based on or upheld by the levels of social and territorial cohesion it has been capable of reaching. Consequently, progressing in the improvement of our welfare state in all its aspects and strengthening territorial cooperation are unavoidable tasks in the coming years. After the intense decentralization

of power and finances involved in the reforms of the statutes of autonomy under way, Spain must tackle the important issues of coordination, cooperation and co-responsibility among the different territories if it wishes to prevent the weakening of the state and, on the other hand, be able to project itself firmly in the international sphere.

Consistent with its aspirations of peace and cohesion, Spanish society has committed itself to furthering democracy and the development of civil rights in what has come to be called the democracy of citizens. Legislative advances have been made in this direction in recent times which must be extended and consolidated in the future. This consolidation depends to a large extent on an effective operation of a public justice service as the efficient guarantee of those rights and freedoms, while there must be consistency between the defence of the rule of law on the domestic front and respect for human rights in action abroad.

In order to secure the above and that citizens can attain increasingly higher degrees of welfare, it is necessary to maintain a sustained level of economic growth in the coming years, while steering the current model of production towards one in which science, technology and innovation play a central role. If it is not done in this way, growth may be seriously affected and the very future of the country along with it. This goal is inseparable from the evolution of the global economy –especially the European economy–, from the growth of international economic relations, from political stability in the main areas of interest for Spain.

It is a reasonable aspiration, and one which is increasingly felt by citizens, to enjoy not only peace, freedom and welfare, but also security in different fields. Security is a component of freedom and if it is not looked after efficiently the temptation arises to cut one to guarantee the other, which is a grave mistake. Modern and open societies are vulnerable, they can be unsafe and reducing that lack of security is one of their greatest challenges. Spain is a country with different problems concerning lack of security: in illegal trafficking –of drugs, of women, etc–; in organized crime –various mafias–; in forms of terrorism –internal and external– and in diverse forms of corruption or environmental accidents. They are problems which, if not curbed, can not only affect our international projection and our capacity for leadership in certain areas, but also, on the other hand, they cannot be tackled without increasing international collaboration and without intelligence instruments at least at a European level.

Spain is a European country of 44m inhabitants –if we count emigrants– in the medium-high band, which figures among the 10 wealthiest nations in the world in terms of GDP and whose ambitions it is advisable to specify and, at the same time, establish priorities. It is clear that Spain cannot aspire to being, nor must it become,

a power with military capabilities or in other fields which, because of its demography or economic capacity, would be beyond its possibilities. However, our country could indeed aspire to being a prominent nation in certain areas if it is capable of choosing them correctly and channelling efforts and the appropriate resources. In this respect, Spain would be in a favourable situation, for example, to take a considerable leap forward in health sciences, in renewable energies, in different sectors of culture –with its powerful language tool–, in cooperation, intelligence, in the environment and in others. It is already a leading country in tourism, financial services, telecommunications or civil construction, among others. However, what image do people in the world have of Spain?

- A recent history of unprecedented success. For the first time, the history of Spain has a happy ending; civil confrontations are essentially a thing of the past; we have joined Europe; we have become a modern country –the world’s eighth economic power. In the space of 30 years of democracy Spain has undergone perhaps the most profound transformation known in Europe, from backwardness and dictatorship to democracy and modernity. That is thanks to an effective transition and to the fact that we have known how to make the most of the opportunities of insertion into Europe: internal reforms and external integration. This is a model which can be appreciated and promoted, though not exported exactly, to other areas of the planet.
- For the first time in its history our country has multinational companies in key sectors, in what we could call the “new economy”, such as financial services, telecommunications, energy, civil engineering, the hotel trade, business, the environment and some industrial sectors. The image of Spain and its weight in the world also depends on the good or bad practice of these companies, on their efficiency, on their social responsibility, on their transparency, on their influence on democratic processes-companies which, regardless of any “economic nationalism”, it is advisable to preserve as “the Spain brand” (as regards head office, management, etc.) regardless of what the composition of a part of its capital might be.
- If there is anything in which Spain can become a leading power it is in the field of culture, of the culture industries in a broad sense. Spain possesses one of the most spoken, written and heard languages and enjoys high creative potential in its society. What is more, culture and its industries, which are connected to multimedia and leisure, are already a growing sector of nations’ wealth and must be much more so in the future.
- Spain still has a reputation for being a country with a good quality of life. We receive almost 60m visitors every year; millions of Europeans choose Spain as a

second home, it is the Europeans' preferred place to work and this is undoubtedly one of our greatest riches in terms of contribution to the GDP. But if this source of wealth is to last into the future it is essential that we look after the landscape; food; infrastructure; property development, the quality of our water and beaches; combat desertification and forest fires, advance in security and not lose too much competitive edge in terms of prices. In short, for our country environmental problems are vital, we should be a power in this field and we are very far from being one. Ecological outrages are frequent and in many areas and nor is this issue regarded as a political priority, in terms of budget or political agenda. Most of the issues mentioned are in some way linked to the state's foreign action.

- In order to foster its image abroad Spain must seek sporting success. In a permanently connected world, in which the mass media play a crucial role, sporting events have an influence on a country's image, on their being well-known and on their possibilities in different fields, including culture and the economy. The success of Spanish sportsmen and sportswomen in football, motor racing, tennis, golf, basketball or athletics have done much to promote awareness of Spain and its prestige.
- In short, the new image of Spain abroad –that of the new generations– should be that of a country committed to peace, to the advancement of civil and environmental rights, to the arts and sciences, to social cohesion, to plurality, to secularism, Europeanism and tolerance, to cooperation. These should be Spain's new distinguishing marks in the 21st century.

However, what elements must be strengthened in the collective imagination?

- We must avoid an imbalance between our economic weight as the eighth power in the world and our political-social and cultural weight abroad. Presently, we could play harder in the international arena. Our foreign policy continues to be excessively reactive, which would perhaps indicate a structural problem which basically consists of an approach which is not sufficiently connected to domestic policy and, in addition, a lack of resources for achieving goals. To be proactive, foreign action should be able to anticipate global trends in world politics.
- We have an economic model that grows more than the European average but which is vulnerable in the medium term. Our inflation is higher than the EU average, our position in terms of education and, above all, Research, Development and Innovation is recovering as Spain no longer grows only on the basis of construction and tourism, in order to continue reducing our balance of payments deficit and gain competitiveness.

Spain is immersed in quite a profound process of territorial decentralization which is going to affect the structure of our state, at least functionally if not constitutionally. The final result could cause us problems and even affect our development in many fields if we do not complement it with greater cooperation and co-responsibility between all the territories and central government. A weakening of territorial cohesion would affect our position abroad. A political decentralization with coordination and cooperation tools improves and strengthens it.

### 1.2 Foreign framework

In the foreseeable future the world will continue to transform with growing speed in an environment of uncertainty in the face of new threats, as well as new possibilities. The main factors that influence its stability will be the following:

- Inequality of all types –economic, social, technological, etc.– which a certain model of globalization is causing. The poverty, or if you prefer, the lack of welfare, health, education, basic services, work. etc. in which the majority of humankind lives is the most decisive factor in the international sphere and a direct or indirect source, of most conflicts. With the levels of inequality in human development as they stand, world stability is unviable.
- It appears obvious that if wealth is concentrated, in terms of capital, technology etc. –in a phrase, in job opportunities– in certain geographic areas of the world, people who scrape by in areas of the globe where it is scarce will migrate en masse to the “rich world” and there will be no way of stopping it unless a serious contribution to the development of those areas is made. Thus migratory flows in the coming years will present a challenge which we shall have to meet, either as an opportunity or as a threat.
- The universe is energy and it moves thanks to energy. At the present time and in the past the history of humankind can also be studied as the history of the harnessing and use of energy. Right now, the energy issue has at least two sides: one, which refers to the guarantee of its supply and, consequently, to its control and the other, which refers to its effects on the environment. In the future, these two aspects will be the cause of instability and conflict or, on the other hand, of fresh opportunities.
- The economic system we have given ourselves –the market or capitalist economy–, just as if left to develop freely without any intervention from the state, generates

excessive inequality, also destroys the environment if it is not corrected, with a growing and imminent risk for the survival of the species. In the coming years it will be one of our most important concerns and –if drastic measures to correct the current situation are not taken– a factor of instability and confrontation.

- Terrorism has different causes and motives and while in no circumstances is it justified, it is advisable to eliminate the breeding grounds in which it can thrive. It is foreseeable that in the coming years this phenomenon will not diminish and that depends essentially on what happens in conflicts such as those of Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, though not those alone. A satisfactory solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem and an organized exit from Iraq and, where appropriate, from Afghanistan can reduce the tension and risks.
- It is foreseeable that in the coming years we shall witness fresh impetus in the arms race, including weapons of mass destruction. The monopoly on arms is a dangerous utopia. History demonstrates that an arms build-up is a vicious circle in which no-one resigns to putting themselves in a position of inferiority that makes them vulnerable. It is not realistic to expect that some have atomic weapons and others do not; that some place curtains of missiles on their borders and others refrain from doing so. Only in the virtuous circle of disarmament, of arms control and a balanced multipolar framework with security guarantees for all could a solution to this dangerous challenge be found. Today we are witnessing a growing militarization of foreign policy, especially on the part of the current American administration and other emerging powers. If this trend is consolidated, which will entail growing military expenditure, it will become more difficult to solve the underlying social and environmental problems.

Along with these transversal factors of instability a new situation for the main players on the international stage is appearing. The rise of some countries, the consolidation or disintegration of regional blocs and the relative decline of others will create friction which can only be channelled via solid global institutions.

The next few years are decisive in the process of European construction and Spain can play a crucial role. While the outcome of the recent Brussels summit, with the agreement reached on the reform of the treaties, is a significant step forward in the process of construction of the Union, it does not entirely clarify its political future, especially on the issues of foreign, security and defence policy, which essentially remain subject to unanimous consensus. However, new horizons are opening up so that those countries that have the political will to do so can establish forms of enhanced and/or structured cooperation in these fields which, at the end of the day, pro-

mote joint progress. In any case, the next few years will be decisive in confirming whether there is the political will to advance in this field. That is to say, once this situation has been overcome, the EU will have to decide whether it has the political will to become an autonomous global political entity or whether it will resign itself to continue being a strategically subordinate player. That will determine what the new integration goals might be once the single market and the euro have been achieved. If it is a matter of playing a prominent and/or leading role on the international stage, the key question of equipping itself with a credible ESDP will arise and whether that is viable among 27 states or whether it must begin with a group of countries which lead the way. A related issue is what the new transatlantic relations must be like. In short, the central issue for the next decade will be whether the EU will be capable of becoming an autonomous global player in the political and strategic field, capable of contributing with its values and interests to the solution of world problems or conflicts and establishing its own strategic alliances on equal terms.

As a result of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the USA has assumed hegemonic status at a global level, in both military and economic terms. However, in a situation of globalization it is not possible to think of hegemony in a traditional sense since power manifests itself at many levels and no country is self-sufficient enough to ensure its welfare and its security. Nevertheless, overcoming the confrontation between blocs has brought to the surface all the rifts and contradictions which remained buried or latent in different countries of the world –an emergence which, as could be expected, has occurred in an uncontrolled manner. The reaction of the Bush administration to the attack on the Twin Towers, the invasion of Afghanistan and then of Iraq has revealed the limits and dangers of American unilateralism. With this attitude, the USA has lost popularity in the world, has caused rifts among its allies, has harmed its economy and has weakened its strategic position. If it does not change its policy, we shall witness a relative decline of its hegemony in the coming years and a calling into question of its leadership. The reproduction of a policy of preventive attacks and military interventions will be dangerous for the world in general and for the EU in particular. A policy of this nature is of no interest to the EU and nor is it to Spain. In addition, that erosion and loss of hegemony on the part of the USA might end, as is already happening, in an accentuation of the tendencies to trust everything to military might.

As a result of this and of processes taking place within the countries themselves the emergence of new regional and/or global players is being consolidated –players which are increasingly less inclined to resign themselves to playing a secondary role on the international stage and which will compete with the current powers in every area. We are talking about China, Russia, India, Brazil, Japan and others. An unde-

sirable situation which we would be well advised to avoid in the future is that of falling into a new form of bipolarism, this time between the USA/China and/or Russia, or any other similar combination. It is in the interests of Spain and the EU to build a balanced multipolar stage with a prominent role for the EU and UN.

China is the world's first demographic power, the fourth-largest economic power; probably the third in military terms, with growing penetration in Africa and Latin America. In the coming years, it will be even more decisive in the international sphere. In order to maintain its current rate of growth for many years yet –which is vital to it– China should have no interest in encouraging external conflicts, rather quite the opposite –see its peacemaking intervention in North Korea– and should prevent them arising at home, which is a real risk given its political system and how it is found wanting in social and environmental terms. In addition, Chinese penetration in Latin America, the Maghreb and Africa in search of raw materials poses fresh economic and political challenges in areas of interest to Spain. In any case, China will continue to offer considerable trade and investment opportunities in the future and it would be a mistake to view it as a threat and not as a strategic partner on whose positive evolution depends a good deal of the future of humankind.

The case of India is similar in demographic and economic terms. At the present time it has less prominence at an international level but a clearer domestic political situation with a view to the future since it has democratic structures.

After the trauma of the implosion of the USSR, Russia is not resigned to being a second-rate power and under the umbrella of its strong energy and military position it will try to gain back some of the lost ground, re-establish its old alliances and even stand up to some US initiatives, as in the cases of the deployment of missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic or the independence of Kosovo. Relations with Russia –the giant next door– are vital for the EU; it is not in our interests for it to feel humiliated or isolated, rather increasingly integrated into a multilateral democratic system. The most likely thing is that the trends towards the “Russian national interest” will become more pronounced, with the rebuilding a strong state that enables it to return to world prominence.

Japan is shaking off its restrictions and complexes derived from the trauma of defeat in World War II and is determined to attain political and military might to match its economic weight. This desire on the part of Japan to become a “normal” power will produce major changes in the list of powers in East Asia. The future of this region and its relative influence at a global level in contrast to the USA and the European Union will depend on the interaction that Tokyo and Beijing establish. While it is li-

kely that Japan's normalization in the international sphere will produce some friction with its neighbours, not least because of the territorial disputes that it maintains with each and every one of them, it is not unfeasible that common economic interests will prevail and they will tighten their cooperation in the future.

Lastly, Brazil is destined to play a leading role in Latin America, for both demographic and economic reasons. Its main challenge will be to promote regional integration in the Southern Cone (Mercosur) and establish a model of social cohesion in the country that can serve as an example to the continent. The most likely trend for the coming years will be the attempt at regional integration in order to guarantee sustained growth, with social cohesion and democracy. Countries such as Mexico and Argentina could play a leading role alongside Brazil in this undertaking.

In the case of Africa, apart from the prominent role which Egypt, Algeria or Morocco might play, the emerging power –without which it will be difficult to tackle problem-solving– will be South Africa, which has already intervened in the resolution of several conflicts.

In the coming years, all these countries will become major international players with which it will be necessary to construct a new world order based on multilateralism and with which Spain and the EU must establish and/or further strategic alliances.

## **2. A broader concept of foreign policy: foreign action**

The first thing it would be advisable to strengthen and develop –and draw the pertinent conclusions– is the inseparable nature of the issues related to foreign relations, to security (including its defence aspect), to cooperation and to intelligence. The old distinction between domestic and foreign policy has blurred. This is because the success of our “domestic” policies depends more than ever on the policies of other countries (beginning with the EU) and because apparently distant events can directly affect us. That requires greater and better coordination among the various policies and players involved in the state’s foreign action, in order to reach Integrated Foreign Action. That involves a reform of the decision-taking mechanisms and of the bodies that implement them, as well as their place in the state’s architecture. In short, it is a matter of devising and implementing a broader theory than traditional foreign policy since the state’s foreign action also comprises economics, culture, society, the military, etc.

Until recently, Spain’s position in the world was based on an essentially historical-geographical conception –that is to say, our famous “key areas” of foreign policy were determined by our geographic position and our history. Thus, we have spent some centuries speaking about Europe, Latin America and the Maghreb or the Mediterranean as our priorities in foreign policy. At the present time, in a global space, that conception is insufficient. We have to move on to an essentially problem-related, thematic or transversal conception which, without neglecting the above, broadens it or complements it. The product of this conglomeration of new players and policies which broaden the traditional conception of foreign policy we call Foreign Action. We cannot continue channelling our foreign action through the traditional so-called “key areas”, in spite of their importance. Today, the ESDP must take into account the real opportunities and threats at a global level, by subject, and they may or may not

coincide with the traditional main areas, as we are seeing at the present time and shall see even more in the future. For example, issues such as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the guarantee of sources of energy, organized crime routes and illegal trafficking, uncontrolled mass emigrations, the threats to the environment or to health, economic or cultural opportunities, political-military alliances far exceed the traditional view of our foreign policy and its deployment. The “Spain in its place” of today does not coincide with that of 30 or 40 years ago and we have to draw conclusions from this new reality. Today we speak of Spain in “many places” or better still, Spain in a global space because our interests are now global and not just “regional”.

For historical reasons, Spain still dogged by a certain degree of self-absorption: it was absent from the two world wars of the 20th century and has joined Europe only a little over 20 years ago. One effect of this is the survival of an inflexible conceptual and operational division between the foreign and domestic spheres of politics, which acts as a major obstacle to the development of our country’s potential. On the one hand, we miss opportunities to gain weight and influence; on the other, we are more vulnerable to the events that take place abroad. Hence the importance of redefining foreign action in government policy and interweaving it into a common body with domestic policy.

Which would be the priority areas and/or countries on the basis of the issues mentioned above?

- In terms of economic interests we could distinguish between commercial flows and flow of investment. In the first section and from the point of view of Spanish imports, among the first 10 countries from which we buy most seven are from the EU (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium), but the fourth is China and the tenth Russia, the eighth being the USA. If we look at it from the export side, once again there are seven EU countries (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium), the USA is sixth, Switzerland is ninth and Mexico tenth, with China in fifteenth place. If we move on to Spain’s investment abroad, from 2000 to 2005 almost half was directed at EU countries, highlighting Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal; the other half at former Eastern bloc countries: Hungary, the Czech Republic; North America: the USA; Morocco; Latin America: Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile; Asia: China.
- If we turn now to the sources of energy that are vital for our country we shall see that they do not coincide with the traditional “key areas” of our foreign policy. If

we take energy in general the top positions are held by Russia, Algeria, Nigeria, Libya and Saudi Arabia. As regards oil, 85% comes from Mexico, Russia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Libya. In the case of natural gas, 45% comes from Algeria and after Nigeria come Qatar, Egypt and Norway. We can see that, except for Russia, Mexico and Norway, the rest are from North Africa, the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa.

- Another of the possible –and very real– threats that might affect our country is international terrorism. It is clear that the origin of this threat is generated in radical Islam because neither the Americas or Europe or non-Islamic Africa pose a threat in this respect. On this issue, the evolution of the Arab world –and particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that of Iraq and the one in Afghanistan– or the development of countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Syria or geographic areas such as the Sahara, etc. are essential for Spain. That is why it is so important to Spain that the Alliance of Civilizations really gets off the ground. And, above all, it must not get involved in unilateral policies of third parties that make it vulnerable. There are major questions here that it would be advisable to analyse. For example, our position in the Western Sahara conflict and its effects not just on relations with Morocco. Likewise the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, which must be settled, as the Alliance of Civilizations High-Level Group says.
- With regard to the terrorist threat, it is now evident that it is not combated by declaring war or bombing countries, still less so by invading them or any other such method. The American internment camps like Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, innocent victims, the torture of prisoners or the CIA flights in Europe have a devastatingly negative effect on the fight against terrorism, not only for the USA but also for its allies. Terrorism must be combated while respecting human rights. The fight against terror is a question of overcoming, in the medium or long term, the reasons and the causes that foster its breeding ground and, in the short term, it is a question of equipping oneself with a powerful Intelligence Community capable of preventing such activity. Spain should try to become an intelligence power, which would require a strengthening and reform of its intelligence services, starting with the CNI. It seems clear that our country cannot aspire to being a military power, nor should this be its goal. In any case, its security in terms of defence must be linked to the developments in this field that take place at EU level and in its military alliances. Spain, however, certainly can aspire to being a power in terms of intelligence and should take steps to be one. This aspect affects not only security problems but also our entire foreign policy in that effective foreign action cannot be carried out without having sound intelligence processed and drawn up in many fields: politics, economics, technology, culture, the military, etc. –intelli-

gence that can only be obtained with extensive deployment on the ground and via up-to-date technology.

- If we look at mass emigrations which, on the one hand, create opportunities for our economy but also cause concerns among the population, we shall see that new areas are arising that we must address and which previously came far down our list of concerns. In addition to traditional emigration from the Latin American countries –Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Argentina, Peru or Central America– or from North Africa –Morocco–, we now have major migratory flows from other zones such as China, Eastern Europe –Romania, Poland, Ukraine– and sub-Saharan Africa –Senegal, the Republic of Guinea, Mali and Ghana–. These new flows pose fresh problems for Spain in its foreign action –from the outset with the EU–, so that it gets involved in its solution, as is already being done, but also from the approach of cooperation policy in which it is necessary to avoid dispersion and ensure coordination. The fact that Spain has begun sending diplomats to these areas shows that we did not have clear information about what was happening. Emigrants will continue to come from these countries unless they are helped to develop themselves and this is precisely what it is necessary to analyse and not scatter resources and efforts.
- One of the biggest tools we have to tackle the decisive issue of emigration is cooperation, though it is not the sole means of channelling it or limiting it. It is not just a matter of allocating 0.5%, 0.7% or even more of GDP to this task, even though that is necessary. We believe that the most pertinent thing is to analyse the effectiveness of that aid, the geographical priorities, intervention criteria and the type of tools for implementing it. Another aspect worth analysing is that of the players in development aid: its executors (central government (ministries); the autonomous communities, local bodies and NGOs, the cooperation council and parliament –with a high degree of consensus on these issues–. There appears to be excessive dispersion and lack of coordination. Current development cooperation promotes institutional reforms, modernizes instruments of intervention and accompanies budgetary resources with political will. Even so, it is too early to speak of a significant impact in a context in which commitments of the past have yet to be honoured.
- Spain, meanwhile, is immersed in an area of political-military alliances which it must tend but which also has to evolve. In our opinion, it is in Spain's interests to work so that a truly European autonomous CFSP and ESDP can thrive. In this respect, it would have been unjustifiable if our country had remained outside the European Arms Agency, an essential tool for building a European defence capabi-

lity. The EU needs a defence industry and Spain must contribute to bringing it about. In the same way, our country should be in the vanguard of the idea to build the germ of a European Armed Forces (EAF) without waiting for the 27 states of the Union to be ready to move in that direction. Spain, along with Portugal, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and perhaps some others could lay the foundations so that this great enterprise could become a reality within a reasonable period of time, by means of the drawing up a precise Road Map, in a similar way to what was done with the euro.

## **3. Priority areas of Foreign Action**

### **3.1 European Union**

The European Union (EU) as an organization and as a process of political integration goes far beyond our foreign action. Since its incorporation in the then European Community in 1986, Europe for Spain has become much more than a priority: integration forms part of the very core of the national project and, therefore, the clearest demonstration that domestic and foreign policy are inseparable.

Now that the period of institutional crisis following the “no” votes in the French and Dutch referendums –which did away with the European Constitution– has been overcome, Spain must aspire to co-leading the future process of political construction of the Union. The aim for Spain must be to try to exploit all the potential of the new text signed in Lisbon in December 2007. This involves, in the short term, ensuring that the reformed treaties on EU and the operation of the EU take effect. Their implementation as of 2009 must serve –regardless of symbolic issues which have been put on the back burner– to ensure that the most important institutional and substantial advances contained in the failed Constitutional Treaty are not squandered. It is in Spain’s interest to have as soon as possible –and to begin to exploit– a new framework appropriate to the future needs of Europe which permits ambitious political developments in the future.

In addition, and given that the EU really does to a large extent comprise the main future political project for Spain, we cannot give up persevering with the idea launched in Laeken in 2001 of equipping the EU with a constitution. Political union is an

ambitious idea for those of us who believe in the advantages of continuing with the work begun 50 years ago and which Spain could only join three decades later. That is why the goal of a constitution, for which this is already a mandate derived from a referendum, must not be abandoned. This goal should at least mean the confirmation of a real status of European citizenship with rights and freedoms and the introduction of a clear regulatory hierarchy in EU law. This, however, is the minimum we should aim for. Beyond that minimum, Spain should maintain a constitutional argument based on the EU which unites principles and values to specific policies.

The EU now faces challenges in various fields which are at the same time challenges for Spain. A correct diagnosis and solution at European level is also necessary to afford solidity and consistency to national responses. To this effect it must make the most of—and be active in—the forecasting exercise for 2020-2030 that the committee of experts headed by Felipe González has to carry out in the next two years. On this premise of scenarios in the medium and long term, we suggest some recommendations of a symbolic, institutional or substantial nature.

From the symbolic point of view, some reforms would stress Spain's commitment to this constitutional model. One is to maintain the project to include a reference to the EU in the Spanish Constitution and another could be the modification of the law on flags to include the European flag on public buildings.

From the institutional point of view, Spain should plan for scenarios after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon and even for scenarios that might emerge if ratification is not completed successfully. In any case, it is clear that the current number of member states and their domestic political plurality could threaten any attempt at consolidating or even the carrying out of any of the community policies. This requires thinking out two options to provide a solution to possible obstacles. The first, from the point of view of constitutional principles, it is necessary to table the debate on the sense in maintaining the rule of unanimity to ratify future reforms. Secondly, Spain must purposefully commit itself to mechanisms of flexibility (such as enhanced cooperation) but preferably to opt-out clauses for those reluctant states. This type of measure would also allow us to keep committing to future enlargements (the Western Balkans and Turkey) if the candidates fulfil requirements. With regard to Turkey, Spain must back its admission once it has met democratic conditions on human rights and the subordination of the military to civil power and not close the door on Ankara in advance. The European Union cannot be seen as a club of rich Christian countries.

Also at an institutional level, in a domestic sense a constitutional policy held by the EU requires the participation and involvement of public opinion. The government

should make improvements in the mechanisms of communication, information and citizens' participation, which have not been significant so far. In addition, parliament and the autonomous communities must be more deeply involved in defining Spain's European policy.

From a substantial point of view, Spain must not adopt a stance based solely on the extraction of immediate short-term returns, be they budgetary or specific policies. Spain must commit to that leadership, become one of the "big" nations (thanks to its demographic growth and rise in GDP per capita). This Spanish leadership should not be based solely on issues of power, rather on proposals and ideas that might be broadly welcomed. It must aspire to increasing its capacity to become a leader on issues such as: culture; financial services; quality tourism; telecommunications; renewable energies; biotechnology; the environment and immigration. It also has to consider its role as a link and bridge with Latin America, the Maghreb and the Mediterranean area; and even the USA. In the case of some current policies –like the CAP–, Spain must accept that the current situation is untenable either economically or politically because it is unfair in its distribution and harmful to developing countries.

Spain's relations with some member states must remain exceptional. Franco-German association must be taken especially into account and extended to form a nucleus as a spearhead of EU development along with Italy, Benelux and above all Portugal. These countries comprise around 60% of the EU and are those that have the clearest pro-European stance though the additional participation of other states that wish to be in the vanguard must not be ruled out.

In the case of Portugal, a true "Iberian position" should be created at the heart of the EU which is permanently institutionalized via Iberian summits prior to the European summits and the creation of a secretariat or office in order to coordinate initiatives. The idea of a union of Spain and Portugal is unfeasible in the foreseeable future but progress can certainly be made on the coordination of positions in the European and Ibero-American area.

Finally, and as far as the EU's foreign policy is concerned, it is necessary to become aware that after the single market and the euro, this issue is the major task. It will be a foreign policy lacking credibility if the Union does not acquire an autonomous capability on security and defence matters. Spain must be behind this issue all the way. It does not appear realistic to hope to achieve a ESDP common to 27 states or even more. The most viable solution would be to advance in this field starting from a vanguard group and on specific issues such as the arms industry, weapons systems, intelligence, transport, satellites, training, etc. Spain certainly has to participate as a

central country in the introduction (Road Map) of a European security and defence policy, though obviously allied to the USA. Its present subordination to US strategy and NATO's tendency to project itself at a global level does not benefit the interests of the EU or Spain. A European security and defence policy needs the United Kingdom, but it is not essential that it is there from the outset. Of course, that EU foreign policy would strengthen multilateralism, and particularly the UN, in the resolution of conflicts. This also mean democratizing and extending the Security Council, which in its present set-up remains an old legacy of World War II. It would be advisable to propose formulas that enable the EU (via its High Representative) to form part of the Council.

In the process towards a consolidation of political Union, our country should prioritize three strategic areas with the purpose of making them European policies. We are talking about the Europe of energy, of emigration and of science and technology. These three matters should have common policies.

### **3.2 Latin America**

The diversity of courses in such a broad region as Latin America makes it impossible to devise a single plan of foreign action, but it must be clear that the main goal is to help to improve levels of economic and social cohesion with sustainable development. Sustained growth in the Ibero-American region is a strategic goal for our country for several reasons: ties of a cultural, historical, political, migratory and economic nature, Spain has 10% of its GDP invested in the region, via its multinationals in telecommunications, banking or energy.

That must be done by investing human and material resources by means of reforms aimed at good governance (basically social policy pacts with fiscal reform), as well as supporting processes of regional integration capable of securing said social cohesion. This means backing a European-inspired model of integration based on the formula market plus cohesion, clearly distinguishable from other models of exclusive free trade. The European model may act as inspiration in some respects and for Spain it is relatively easy to build bridges with the Latin American countries thanks to its own successful experience.

This is about offering the Latin American countries sustained political and financial support for a solid development project. Therefore it is in our country's interest to create a genuine Ibero-American community of nations in strategic association with

the EU. That would require two things: firstly, reforming the operating method of the Summits, giving them a more functional nature while offering more political support; and secondly, redoubling efforts to attract the interest of the main European partners of Spain towards the Latin American region at a time when their attention is being turned towards Eastern Europe and other areas for energy or geostrategic reasons. This requires a notable effort from Spain that must be made as soon as possible, at a time of major changes in the region where different models compete. If Latin America drifts away from Europe in favour of North America or Asia, the main loser would be Spain.

The priority should be relations with Mercosur, or at least with its main members, especially Brazil and also Argentina, helping from Europe to overcome the institutional weakness of said regional organization. Failing that, Spain must support any unification project in the Southern Cone based on the aforementioned premises. In this context, a bilateral approach to the Brazilian giant cannot be ruled out, provided that it is geared towards strengthening the regional framework. Mexico must be a main priority in the same line as stimulating an approach to the Southern Cone and of leading, alongside Brazil and Argentina, an area of democracy, economic growth and social cohesion. Mexico's role is essential in structuring the economies of Central America, as well as in its role as interlocutor with a large part of the Hispanic population living in the USA.

Spain must launch and lead an initiative consisting of the creation and financing of a powerful Regional Development Fund along with the EU –without ruling out the future participation of the USA– similar to those that have operated in Europe with the medium-term goal of creating a Euro-Ibero-American area of social cohesion. At the same time, Spain should help to set in motion an effective financial institution specialized in regional infrastructures, which are necessary for territorial cohesion. This could comprise a powerful development aid tool, complementing those that already exist.

Thanks to its “special relationship” derived from the close ties with Latin America, Spain can play a prominent connecting role not only between the EU and Latin America, but also between Latin America and the USA. Spain and the EU should make a sustained diplomatic effort in order to engage the next US administration with a new vision of relations with Latin America, closer to the European one, and with a common interest: for the region to advance down a path of sustained economic growth, democracy and social cohesion. Spain must activate a high-level political and civil society effort –companies, think tanks, NGOs, etc.– to influence US political and business agents to that effect. North American partners must be shown

that current free trade agreements are not enough –apart from the fact that they disturb trade with third countries and the international trade system– and that it is necessary to complement free trade with massive support in terms of financial and human resources which allow the foundations of social cohesion to be laid.

This does not prevent our foreign action from enjoying greater visibility and importance in the everyday life of civil society in the small countries, mainly Central America and the Andean nations. Spain's efforts in support of processes of modernization and transparency of the institutions must continue, promoting transparency in the action of the judicial system, of the security forces, equal opportunities for all, with active policies for women and Indian collectives, etc. From the point of view of production, support of local networks where micro-companies and small companies comprise the economic structure is a central point, not forgetting the contribution that Spain and the EU can make to collectivism, providing technology, the training of the work force and the incorporation of added value into traditional products.

A significant flow of immigrants into Spain has its origin in the Andean countries, which means that foreign action designed to boost the region economically and socially is already a “domestic” policy. As well as the resources provided from the public and private sector, the growing remittances sent to the region could be an important source of funding for development. This requires the creation of a financial system capable of channelling the resources from consumption towards investment, similar to the purpose that savings banks served in the 1960s in the Spanish economy.

After more than two decades of commitment from the Spanish government and civil society to development aid, it is necessary to review our development cooperation in the region in order to coordinate better and be more effective with our contributions. Our cooperation must not stop at humanitarian aid to mitigate isolated situations, rather it has to contribute to breaking the structural vicious circle. To this effect it is essential to boost help in technological cooperation with specific plans in priority areas: fiscal reform (Inland Revenue), the judicial system, domestic security and infrastructures.

It seems contradictory to back development and free trade with Latin America and continue defending the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in its current form. If we want Doha and successive meetings to end in positive results, the EU and the USA must modify their stance. Spain must lead the reform of the CAP with a view to its Latin American partners.

In the same way, the presence of Spanish multinationals in the region poses significant challenges to a foreign action, such as:

- Coordinating action of the companies with development cooperation, the image and consideration of Spain, good governance, corporate social responsibility, the environment, social rights, contractual fairness, etc.
- Expanding the companies with Spanish headquarters or the Spanish “brand” internationally, avoiding both short-sighted nationalism and naivety in the face of other players who defend their interests. The fact that Telefónica, Repsol, Endesa, Santander or BBVA have their headquarters and their decision-taking centres in Spain or outside it is very important to foreign action.

In the specific case of Cuba, Spain’s goal must be to improve the living conditions of the Cuban people and respect for human rights, favouring the political liberalization of the current regime based on boosting economic and social development. Spain must contribute to technical cooperation and investment, as well as mediate in the dialogue with the sectors of the opposition and national reconciliation. At the same time, it must lobby with the EU and influential sectors of US civil society, political and business worlds for a lifting of the US embargo on the island which enables economic development and strips the sector most resistant to change of its arguments.

### 3.3 The Maghreb and the Middle East

#### A) Priority goals in the Maghreb

The general goal for Spain must be to reach a global policy for the Maghreb, overcoming asymmetric and unbalanced relations and the fluctuations of successive governments. To do so, it must structure its relations with the region around three criteria: strengthening relations of good neighbourliness with procedures based on respect for others’ interests; defending our own interests; and promoting common values in the societies of both shores. Spain must preserve a special and privileged relationship with the Arab world and translate it into intense political, economic, cultural and social cooperation.

With this as the basic premise, the strategic goals would be the following:

- To permanently overcome territorial disputes and issues, particularly present in relations with Morocco, but also with Algeria. This can be achieved by applying and favouring new political solutions in the areas that generate most tension.
  - It is vital to defend a fair and lasting solution to the Sahraoui conflict in the Western Sahara, as prompt as possible but not by any means or at any price. Spain is eager to push the resolution of the conflict along and it is true that this requires immediate measures. Spain must back a balanced solution that provides guarantees to all parties. Bearing in mind the limited capacity that Spain has of “mediating” in a conflict of which it is historically a part, Spain can do a lot in the Western Sahara via indirect channels, by means of socio-economic development, respect for freedoms and rapprochement between the two populations.
  - In Ceuta and Melilla, the surrounding population does not pose a threat to Spanish sovereignty as it does a profitable trade with the two cities. However, it is necessary to gradually replace informal trade and contraband for regular exchange, making Ceuta and Melilla two poles of development in contact with their Moroccan hinterland. Those poles of development will only be viable if they are based on agreement and complementarity.
- The opportunity will arise with the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, which is scheduled to take effect in 2010.
  - It is necessary to promote the development and integration of the immediate North African area. The development of the Rif depends to a large extent on the re-opening of the Algerian-Moroccan border, an event that would relaunch the north of Morocco economically and would temper the Western Sahara conflict.
- To transform the Maghreb into a dynamic region, with medium-high development and a trend towards integration. To do that requires the following:
  - Promoting a stable framework of Euro-Maghrebi co-development which includes key issues such as the fishing, agriculture, energy and emigration that unite us to Morocco and Algeria. To this effect, Spain must assess the achievements and remaining challenges of the Barcelona Process it led in 1995 in the light of the Mediterranean Union project of French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Spain must manoeuvre with diplomatic skill and determination and secure the commitment undertaken in the region by its European partners in the north, such as Germany and the United Kingdom. The present European protectionism in some sectors must come to halt and give way to full Euro-Maghrebi business integra-

tion which instead of limiting trade (with the system of agricultural and textile quotas), encourages it. But free trade and restructured macro-economic management will not be enough. For example, GDP and poverty increased at the same time in Morocco in the 1990s. Public investment has to be vigorous and the EU and Spain must increase aid via the MEDA funds and the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the interests of a more humane and sustainable growth.

- Removing the obstacles to Maghrebi regional integration, in spite of the difficulties. Spain and the EU should therefore complement the free trade area with south-south cooperation projects that encourage intra-Maghrebi trade. Spain must consider stopping its sale of military equipment to the countries of the area that are in conflict, in the shape of an arms trade bill. To this effect, Spain must lobby for a political commitment at EU level to eliminate or at least jointly supervise the sale of equipment in that area.
- To put social cohesion at the centre of economic growth:
  - In Algeria, Spain must support the training of human resources in view of the severe consequences of economic and political transition. There are other crucial problems that had a direct impact on the daily life of the population, such as unemployment, lack of job security and over-exploitation, the deterioration of medical attention and public health or environmental deterioration. Spain can help in campaigns of training, prevention and emergency services action –not with financial aid that Algeria does not need, rather by contributing to the social capital of the population. The equality of the sexes continues to be a burden on the development of Algeria. Spain can contribute by drawing on its own experience in areas such as female employment, electoral parity, the fight against gender-based violence or the violation of human rights.
  - Guaranteeing the integration of the sub-Saharan population that lives in the countries of the Maghreb and which will presumably continue to grow. Spain and the EU should make sure that the adoption –at their request– of restrictive policies on emigration from third countries on the part of the countries of the Maghreb does not result in the legal marginalization and marginalization from the labour market of this sub-Saharan population.
- To achieve greater interdependence among the societies on both shores of the Mediterranean which destroys prejudice and creates positive synergies:

- Reinforcing educational, cultural and scientific relations with the Maghreb. Culture, science and education have to carry much more weight in Spain's foreign action, in general and in this region in particular. Educational and cultural cooperation, which is still scarce, has a very important multiplier effect in the political and economic sphere, comparable to the promotion of equality of the sexes in development cooperation. To this effect, Spain has an interest in the creation of a Mediterranean University.
- Accompanying the positive phenomenon of the “second and third generation”, young sons and daughters of emigrants from Morocco and to a lesser extent, Algeria, who will find professional jobs of greater recognition and prestige. This will serve to eliminate cultural prejudices and sexism on both shores directed particularly at the most vulnerable sections of the population: women and girls.
- Dividing up the Alliance of Civilizations into numerous initiatives that are as decentralized as possible, such as:
  - Generous grants programmes not only for universities (improved Erasmus Mundus Mediterraneo) but also for work experience in companies and vocational training for the countries of the Maghreb and the Sahel (the source of a growing number of migratory flows).
  - The rapid adaptation of institutions, including the media, to the diversity arising out of emigration.
  - Inclusion of the Islamic religion on the teaching curriculum, deactivating incomprehension and misconceptions.
  - A significant effort in reciprocal translation in the field of bilateral cultural creation (cinema, music, theatre, the plastic arts, comics, crafts, etc.).
  - Raising the level of the Mediterranean theatre festival to the level of the Ibero-American theatre and cinema festivals.
- To carry out processes of political and economic transition in a comprehensive and coherent way:
  - In the entire Maghreb it is necessary to avoid disassociating growth and democratization, economic change and political change. To this effect, Tunisia should no longer be presented as model of growth for the region and much

less so as an example of democratization. For diverse and complex societies such as Algeria and Morocco, it is not desirable to have macro-economic growth at the expense of the regions of the south and interior and of the most basic civil and political liberties. As nor is it desirable to witness apparent political change without social and economic reforms which enable upward social mobility.

- In the context of the international fight against terrorism, effective repression must not be mistaken for political stability. Stability is not achieved with a police state, rather with a comprehensive political and economic transition.

### **B) Priority goals in the Middle East**

The Middle East conflict obstructs the peace and prosperity of the zone and serves as a pretext for phenomena such as radical Islam or jihadist terrorism. That is why the immediate goal is the creation of a politically sovereign, economically viable and territorially whole Palestinian state. It is necessary to provide for the right to return of the refugees and its differential application, according to the cases (desire, renunciation, physical impossibility, return to another place in Palestine, compensation, etc.).

At the same time, Israel's right to peaceful existence must be secured, within the borders recognized internationally, by means of Palestinian guarantees and a regional security agreement that would arise out of a multilateral peace conference.

Spain has supported the organization of an international peace conference that brings together the countries of the region with the international Quartet. Said conference, in two phases, should first deal with the Palestinian issue (creation of a Palestinian state in the conditions mentioned above). In this first phase, negotiations would be bilateral and the agreements endorsed by all the states in the region and the participants in the conference. The second phase would address the transversal issues that affect regional peace and security: the return of territories occupied in the war of 1967 in exchange for full recognition for Israel and Arab-Israeli and Iranian-Israeli friendship treaties; recognition and definition of borders among all the states, following the example of the border solution between Turkey and Syria; the water issue, nuclear disarmament (Israel and Iran's abandonment); the organized and flexible return of those refugees that wish to go back or compensation when it is not possible to exercise the right.

However, Spain and the EU should take it very much into account that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not the only destabilizing factor, nor would its hypothetical pacification solve other latent issues in the zone. These are, among others,

the democratization of the regimes in the area, access to welfare for the majority of the population, the development and use of nuclear energy or the impact of new emerging powers such as Iran.

Progress must be made in the full restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. The pacification and reconstruction of Iraq must be done in the way it was done after the civil war in Lebanon. When the time comes, Spain and EU will have to be ready to help in some way with reconstruction since the stability of Iraq –and therefore the stability of the region– is also vital to Europe. The withdrawal from Iraq must be gradual but it must also begin immediately. The collaboration of Saudi Arabia and Iran in a new stabilized Iraq is fundamental. This requires an integrationist political system which is not based on ethnic or regional differences, as it is now.

Assisting in the stabilization of Lebanon and a new “non-community based” political system –a system based on common legal, economic and political institutions, such as a unitary civil code and non-confessional political representation–, in which, however, there can be associative mechanisms which protect the minorities. It is vital to make fresh efforts in the economic reconstruction of Lebanon following the war that devastated the country in 2006.

Backing social cohesion and political transition in Egypt, which because of its demographic and economic weight is a key piece in the zone and is going to play a growing role. An economic boom and fair development of the country are required, with the emphasis on infrastructure and public services, guaranteeing access to a large strata of the population without resources. Political transition must be carried out thanks to a coalition of opposition forces which brings together religious and secular forces, capable of coming to an agreement on the democratic principles of a new regime.

Normalizing relations with Iran. On this matter, Europe’s position must remain autonomous, avoiding the generation of more tension and focusing on organizing an international conference that accommodates Iran. Europe must find a flexible, but guaranteed, way of accommodating the Iranian desire to produce nuclear energy, with safeguards so that it does not acquire nuclear weapons. It is a matter of patiently defusing the main sources of tension at the present time (Palestine, the Iranian nuclear programme and Iraq), which in turn affect Iranian-European relations. From that point on, the potential for collaborating in the Alliance of Civilizations and in the energy and trade fields must be exploited to the full. It is necessary to solve the dreadful dilemma of the bomb and Iran or the bomb on Iran.

### 3.4 The United States

No policy of a global scope has any chance of success without the USA. That calls for Spain to define its goals and its strategy with regard to the so-called hyperpower very clearly. Generally speaking, transatlantic relations –in both their dimensions, Spain-USA and EU-USA– are characterized by asymmetry, derived from a difference in relative weight in terms of military and political power and, to a lesser extent, economic power.

Spain's basic goal is to redress the balance as far as possible in a bilateral relationship that is somewhat outmoded on the political and military planes since it does not fully correspond to Spain's scope for action as the eighth power in the world and its insertion in the EU. In its current form, the benefits of the relationship in the political and security fields prove insufficient and dubious, at least.

But, given the weight of the North American power, said redressing of the balance can only be put into effect if it is carried out via multilateral channels, basically via the EU, but also via multilateral forums and cooperation with third countries (and triangular relations). In all these fields the principles that guide relations must be pragmatism and mutual respect, fostering common values and interests and minimizing the divergent ones, without making concessions that harm the national interest. A new Democratic administration as of January 2009 would open up a favourable scenario for greater cooperation.

Spain's strategic goals in its relations with the USA can be structured along four lines:

- Goals to be reached via Spain-USA bilateral relations:
  - Consolidate the USA as one of the major investors in Spain. Currently, the USA is our sixth-biggest trade partner and the biggest individual foreign investor in our country.
  - Redress the balance of bilateral relations in the area of defence. This can be done in two ways at the same time. Firstly, by undertaking a staggered review of the defence agreement with the USA (as regards the use of bases and the intelligence services) as progress is made in European defence. Spain should abandon bilateralism and advance in the direction of NATO and/or Europeanization, that is to say, of integrating those mechanism into NATO and into Eu-

ropean defence. From the outset, Spain must not authorize the use of the bases in operations that do not have Security Council backing. Secondly, by contributing to an increasingly autonomous nucleus of European defence.

- Establish more systematic collaboration in both directions between Spanish and US higher education and research. That would bring benefits to Spain in an area where it is lacking. It can be achieved by the creation of joint teams and the opening up of a specific transatlantic section in the European Commission's framework programmes for research.
  - Exploit the opportunities presented by access to the Hispanic sector of the USA to influence the economic and cultural planes (though without overestimating the political plane, since opportunities are limited here). It would be good to provide training for teachers of Spanish in US educational centres.
- Goals to be achieved via EU-USA transatlantic relations
    - The centre of the world is shifting, or rather the transatlantic network has to adapt to new networks, since both the EU and the USA are in relative decline in relation to the emerging powers. Transatlantic cooperation is a significant –but not the only– part of Europe and the USA's international projection. In this context, Spain's goal is to contribute within the EU to redirecting the USA towards multilateralism and a world comprising many poles. To this end, it must develop cooperation in five interconnecting areas: trade and investment, energy, the environment, security, promoting democracy and the fight against poverty.
      - Allowing the rest of the world access to the benefits of greater “deep integration”. Included here is the resolution of sectorial disputes and the commitment to attaining a world trade avenue (the opening of agricultural markets to the developing countries and compensation in exchange for the opening up of services in the shape of investment in education and health).
      - Strengthening the transatlantic area as the most advanced technological area in the world in terms of Research, Development and Innovation. This direction requires more cooperation, improvement in productivity and reintegrating those who have lost out with globalization.
      - Creating a balanced system between new sources of energy and climate change between the USA and the EU. Here it is necessary to commit to a specific multilateral dialogue forum, a Kyoto plus.

## The goals of Spain in its Foreign Action

- Taking some of the load of responsibility from NATO by means of European and United Nations missions. It is necessary to reconsider transatlantic security in terms of more and better United Nations and less and better NATO.
  - Getting involved in the creation of solid regional security bodies to tackle key issues in the Middle East (the Palestinian conflict), Asia (North Korea, Kashmir and Sino-Japanese relations), Africa (humanitarian crises) and Latin America (drug-trafficking).
  - Committing ourselves to the reform of the international nuclear situation, putting a stop to double standards and engaging in dialogue with the emerging powers.
  - Opening a transatlantic intelligence channel to smash international terrorist networks.
  - In the field of promoting democracy, agreeing on a common definition of acceptable democracies, the limits of action against authoritarian regimes and the specific strategies for building democracy from social foundations.
  - Not accepting cuts in freedoms in the fight against terrorism or unilateral decisions which affect their citizens (spying, visas, etc.).
- Goals to be achieved via multilateral forums
    - Spain must promote the creation of a single EU seat in economic forums to engage with the USA in a more balanced way.
    - Spain must establish itself as a reliable member in NATO, but under new premises: maintenance of NATO missions in its area and reinforcement of the civil role in the organization and action under UN authorization.
  - Goals to be achieved via cooperation with third countries (and triangular relations)
    - Strengthen cooperation with the USA in geographic areas and key countries for the security and economic prosperity of Spain, in this order of priority: Latin America, the Maghreb and the Middle East. This can be achieved in the following ways:

- In Latin America, Spain's goal should be to become a privileged partner of the USA, acting jointly on strategic programmes of promotion of democracy and social cohesion along with Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.
- In the Middle East and the Maghreb, carrying out joint initiatives for the integration and normalization of Islamist groups in the political game.
- Joint Spanish-US cooperation with third governments for comprehensive reconstruction or restructuring plans (especially in Central America, the Caribbean and the Andean countries).

### 3.5 Sub-Saharan Africa

In 2006, Spain launched Plan Africa, which is the first comprehensive plan from the Spanish administration as a whole directed at the sub-Saharan countries. The Plan covers a very short period of time, 2006-2008, which is not enough to reconsider Spain's relations with the entire sub-Saharan continent, an area which has never been a priority of our country's foreign policy. This is reflected, for example, in the very low level of trade exchange or investment with countries south of the Sahara. That is why a new plan is required, one which covers the entire period of office and which continuing down the path of what has been begun, makes a qualitative leap in series of issues. As a general principle, relations between Spain and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa must go much further than the migratory issue, as can be gathered from Plan Africa.

Our strategic goal is to obtain greater political and economic association with the leading countries of the continent, particularly with South Africa, which is becoming the real continental power. High-level diplomatic and political visits must be promoted, as well as the signing of a strategic association agreement. Likewise, Nigeria, which provides 25% of our oil and a good portion of our gas, must be another preferred partner. In this respect, the possible direct entry of our oil multinationals into the Gulf of Niger must be accompanied by new policies on their part, which include broad programmes of social and educational action, reinvestment in development projects in the affected communities, very great care of the local environment and a much fairer distribution of the profits. Finally, Kenya and Uganda are dominant powers in East Africa and economic and political relations remain limited.

Spain is increasing its commitment to Africa considerably in terms of aid and also in terms of visibility in international forums which advocate African development. However, this contrasts to a large extent with some practices which move in the opposite direction. In this respect, Spain should announce as soon as possible its support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which though not an exclusively African initiative has its main field of action there –and undertake the commitments which that involves in relation to Spanish companies which operate in that sector–. In addition, Spain is one of the biggest European exporters of light weapons to Africa and it also exports cluster bombs. The law controlling the arms trade and dual-purpose equipment must be passed urgently and the manufacture of cluster bombs and antipersonnel mines completely prohibited. The government must create a forum of debate with Spanish weapons companies to improve self-control of the weapons exported and radically halt sales of weapons to African countries in conflict or which are coming out of a conflict, fragile or unstable states or their neighbours when there is the suspicion that weapons may be resold.

The number of African immigrants in Spain –130,000– is less than 2% of the total. It is necessary to continue the Rabat Conference of 2006 and promote greater information and knowledge on the part of Spanish citizens about sub-Saharan immigration. Spain should work so that the cooperation agreement on immigration between the EU and Africa, which the Portuguese presidency means to achieve in the second half of 2007, includes not only measures against illegal immigration but also improved mechanisms of insertion and bigger quotas for legal immigrants.

In the future, cooperation with the countries of origin or transit of illegal immigrants must be extended to tackle the causes that lead to this type of immigration, though in many cases the causes are poverty and underdevelopment, which will not be solved for some considerable time. A basic effort must be made to raise the quotas for sub-Saharan immigrants entering Spain legally to the maximum, extending and improving programmes of recruitment at source and providing incentives to businessmen so that they hire this kind of worker. Also promote and extend co-development initiatives, in which immigrants settled in Spain collaborate (like those of the current pilot project with Senegal).

It is clear that the future of the development of Africa depends on the resolution of conflicts and the chronic instability that affects many parts the continent. Spain could keep a more prominent profile in this respect, which would connect well with and broaden the terms of the Alliance of Civilizations. The path to follow would be that of determined support for the African mechanisms of prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. This requires greater support of and impetus to the crea-

tion of the African Standby Force (ASBF), whose progress has been very slow so far. It also requires increasing contributions to and support of the European Union fund for peace in Africa (African Peace Facility). Spain has kept a low profile in conflicts such as the one in Somalia. In the case of Darfur, Spain is making an effort in military and humanitarian logistics.

Spain is making a major effort to increase the quantity and quality of its aid to the sub-Saharan continent. This course of action must be maintained and stepped up. Greater selectivity is required when choosing the African nations that receive Spanish aid. It is also necessary to limit the conditions of the aid to those which refer to its sound management and progress with greater determination in new aid instruments, such as budgetary support or joint programming in contrast to traditional projects. In addition, wholehearted support must be given to a greater cancellation of African debt, extended to more countries than at the present time.

At a European level, Spain must become more involved than what it has been until now in the devising of the European strategy for Africa, which has as its milestone the Lisbon summit of December 2008. In particular, Spain could lead the group of European countries that believe that the negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and Africa within the Cotonou framework must be, above all, a development tool (in contrast to more commercial stances or those that have the national interest in mind). This means tabling flexible and asymmetric proposals which allow greater African insertion into international trade. The Spanish position must be both to defend national trade interests and promote African development.

Spain must make a clear commitment to African economic and political integration. This involves supporting not only continental institutions, but also regional ones. In terms of cooperation, the AECID should implement regional cooperation programmes with Africa, similar to those that exist for Latin America. In addition, Spain could use the Latin American experience to promote south-south cooperation and experience-swapping at regional levels.

Spanish is a language that is barely spoken in Africa, but there is rapidly-growing interest. A plan of openings and deployment of the Instituto Cervantes in major African capitals should be drawn up.

Spain could launch a programme of grants for sub-Saharan Africans who come to study in our country. It would be something similar to what is being done with Latin America, including the condition of returning to their countries of origin when their studies have finished to prevent a brain drain.

With regard to Equatorial Guinea, Spain must not cease in its efforts to promote the development and democratization of our former colony in Central Africa. It is necessary to redress the balance of the situation so that, without renouncing possible oil exploration, political dialogue remains high on the bilateral agenda. Meanwhile, the programmes of institution-strengthening and support for Guinean civil society associations, political parties and trade unions must be reinforced.

### 3.6 Asia-Pacific

In recent years, we have been witnessing the rapid ascent of the Asia-Pacific region, which has resulted in a loss of the relative weight of the Atlantic axis in favour of the Pacific and a progressively tripolar world. Given this situation, Spanish foreign policy has paid greater attention to this region in the last two periods of office, as is demonstrated by the presentation of the Asia-Pacific Framework Plan (2001) and the Asia-Pacific Plan of Action (2005). In spite of these advances, we still lag way behind the countries around us.

The main goal of our foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region should be to strengthen the political, economic and cultural weight of Spain in the most populous and economically dynamic area on the planet. The price of not doing so would be very high indeed, as our European partners –who are way ahead of us in this respect– have already understood. Particularly urgent is our need to increase our presence on all fronts in China and India, which will continue to drive the world economy in the coming years and which comprise more than a third of the world's population.

In the economic field, our foreign policy has a particularly important role to play in this region, given the very close relationship that exists between the political and economic elites in numerous Asia-Pacific countries. Many business opportunities that are going to arise in these countries will only be available to Spanish companies if we maintain free-flowing political relations with their governments.

A second goal is to diversify our foreign policy in the region and not confine ourselves to improving relations with the three major Asian powers –Japan, China and India. It is important here to highlight the geostrategic importance of Central Asia, especially because of its energy reserves and its geographic location; the economic potential of countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Bangladesh, with high rates of economic growth and a combined population of almost 500m people; and the threat posed by the attempts at penetration of transnational terror in countries such as Pa-

kistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Thailand and Singapore, which like Spain suffer that scourge on their own territory. The case of Vietnam could be particularly pertinent in that its process of economic transition –social and subsequently political– might influence other processes such as that of Cuba, a country of great importance to Spain. In addition, Vietnam has showed great interest in the Spanish model.

A third goal is to connect with the majority of the Asia-Pacific countries in their desire to promote a multilateral international system. A clear example has been the positive response that the Alliance of Civilizations proposal has received in the region.

A fourth goal is the expansion of our “soft power” –basically the Spanish language and the culture industries– among 50% of the world’s population. Extending the offices of the Instituto Cervantes and grants to train teachers of Spanish in Spanish centres should be a priority.

Another goal would be to put a stop to the growing illegal immigration from Asia. That requires intensifying cooperation with the countries of origin and signing repatriation agreements.

As far as we can Spain must also aim to combat non-traditional threats as well as terrorism, such as environmental deterioration, the spread of pandemics, drug-trafficking, whose origin is the Asia-Pacific and which can threaten our security.

In order to achieve all these goals, the first step is to appreciate that our traditional model of foreign policy focused on Europe, the Mediterranean and Latin America does not meet the challenges of the 21st century effectively. In a globalized world, whose centre of gravity is progressively shifting towards the Asia-Pacific, this region must be included among the priority areas of our foreign policy.

Among other things, this involves allocating greater human and physical resources to our foreign action in the Asia-Pacific region. There can be no excuse for not tackling this issue during the current reform of our foreign service. High-level official visits must also be promoted to the maximum, both their frequency and the rank and size of the delegations.

One of the greatest burdens on our relations with the Asian countries is mutual ignorance. Consequently, there must be more investment in the dissemination of knowledge of the languages and cultures of these countries in Spain (by means of establishing training and research programmes, subsidies for translations, grants, etc.)

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and in the promotion of Spanish and of our country's image in this region. On this last point, we must be capable of combining the traditional image of Spain as a country of flamenco, bullfighting and football (partly positive for the promotion of our tourism) with that of modern and industrialized country, a port of entry into Europe and Latin America. Thus we shall help to attract Asian investment and tourism –with enormous potential in the coming years– and intensify our exports. Another barrier to bilateral relations is our visa policy, which proves excessively restrictive on account of its effect on businessmen, academics and students.

Likewise, we must make greater use of the various international and supranational organizations in which we participate, especially the European Union to structure our foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region.

Lastly, it would also be positive if our foreign policy as regards the Asia-Pacific remained a policy of state, agreed by consensus among the main parties and with the participation of the different levels of the administration and civil society.

## 4. The transversal policies of foreign action

### 4.1 Security

#### A) Defence as security

As has already been said in the first section, the new threats –asymmetric, like terrorism, or global pandemics– and other issues which are extremely important, such as energy dependence or the deterioration of the environment, pose one of the most pressing challenges for our country. That challenge consists of expanding our concept of security, making it broader than the traditional idea of defence. Defence is a decisive part of security, but it does not cover all its aspects. None of the new threats is simply military nor can they be stopped by solely military means. These threats cannot be tackled effectively without increasing international cooperation and without a series of powerful intelligence tools, at the very least in the European area.

Therefore we have three priority courses of action which should accompany our defence policy: a) policies to eradicate the factors that foster terrorism in the world: inequality, political oppression or fanaticism; b) improve cooperation in preventive intelligence; and c) cooperate at all levels with the Arab and Islamic world, in the fashion of the Alliance of Civilizations or a similar scheme.

Very especially, the boosting of cooperation in intelligence must begin, as is logical, with the EU – particularly France –, with the purpose of creating a solid intelligence community at European level, with technological resources appropriate to the current threats. In addition, Spain and the EU should strengthen ties with key countries for

this type of operation, such as the USA, Morocco, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt. Spain must also strengthen the presence of its intelligence services abroad and in areas other than counterterrorism. It is necessary to increase the number of specialists in the Arab world among diplomats, military staff, the police, academics and journalists. It would be a good idea to set up a programme of recruitment of ethnic minorities and another for improving language skills.

In the globalized world we live in today, Spain cannot confront the new threats alone nor can it aspire to being a military power. Hence our necessary integration and presence in the EU, international organizations, military alliances, participation in peace missions and links to international treaties. Working on the premises of respect for international law and human rights, our action must be guided by effective multilateralism. Within the framework of the EU we must:

- Promote the ESDP via our integration into the frontrunners or nucleus that is formed in order to establish “permanent structured cooperation” and try to reach a common European defence capability that complements NATO. Just as the USA does not entrust its entire defence to NATO, the EU must build its own capabilities for its own defence and security.
- Define the defence budget in coordination with the EU and in a more rational way so as to improve our capabilities to do so we must form part of the advance party of countries that are in the European defence agency and develop this body.
- Contribute to a new more global European security strategy which tackles all the issues that concern Spain in this field and update the “Solana document”.
- Continue the transformation of our armed forces in order to make them more flexible and adaptable to new requirements and challenges.
- Take part in international conflict-prevention and crisis-management missions with military and civilian resources. Spain should reflect on the number of its troops on peace and humanitarian missions abroad, currently limited to 3,000 forces.
- Create a security culture among citizens; among other means, by raising awareness and the permeability between civil society and the armed forces to explain the current duties and improve its appreciation as an institution, which is already high.

An area which remains partly unexplored is the leadership of and contribution from Spain to the training of the armed forces of the Ibero-American countries and, where

appropriate, for the creation of Ibero-American peace forces. Here we could participate in a school for the training of Ibero-American military personnel on this type of mission.

## **B) Energy security**

In recent years, we have witnessed a growing politicization of energy so that this is no longer presented as a purely technical and economic issue, rather increasingly linked to the notion of security. Without doubt, energy security has come to form a fundamental dimension of the foreign policy of every country in the world, be they producers or consumers.

Spain's energy dependency is total and well-known. Our supplies of hydrocarbons and of gas come from abroad. Consequently, the goal of our foreign action must be to secure these supplies in the long term in more beneficial quantities and at more beneficial prices, though in accordance with our values of justice and democracy.

Traditionally, the concept of energy security referred to the security of supply, understood as the availability of an appropriate supply of energy at affordable prices. But it is now necessary to broaden the concept to include other kinds of risks:

- Political risks
  - The concentration of approximately 85% of the known reserves of oil and gas in the hands of the national companies of the major producing countries (NOCs) implies the possible use of energy as a political weapon, be it on the part of a single major producer or several of them.
  - Possible internal or external destabilization (wars or invasions) of one or more providers.
  - The risks of temporary interruptions of supply because of regional conflicts.
- Economic risks
  - The growing “oil nationalism” of producing countries that place increasingly burdensome conditions on the major international companies (IOCs), which in turn tend to merge to exercise more strength so that the hydrocarbons trade is becoming a “business between states”.

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- The growing competition between IOCs and NOCs and among countries (even among members of the OECD and/or the EU) to obtain contracts for resources that are increasingly expensive and scarce.
- Technical risks
  - The absence of reliable data on the natural decline in production of the majority of the NOCs and on the reserves of hydrocarbons declared by the NOCs.
  - Vulnerability to accidents and terrorist attack of the energy infrastructures and transport networks.
- Environmental risks
  - Global warming on account of the emission of greenhouse gases.
  - The ecologically and humanly unsustainable nature of the universalization of the current model of intensive consumption of energy.

Each energy source can be analysed from this point of view to determine the degree of risk it poses. Generally speaking, the Spanish energy model has:

- Disadvantages: excessive dependency on hydrocarbons (70% compared to the European average of 50%); major foreign dependency (75% compared to the European average of 50%); we are an island in energy terms with few interconnections with the rest of Europe; our CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are on the rise and as a result we have problems honouring our environmental commitments.
- Advantages: the supply of oil is well diversified; our main supplier of gas –Algeria– has proven to be reliable even in the worst moments of its internal conflict; the commitment to liquid gas enables greater flexibility and diversification of supply; in recent years our country has experienced a sharp growth of renewable energies, with companies competing at a world level.

Presumably, in the next 10 years gas is the only source of energy that will grow significantly to meet the increase in demand. However, gas is precisely the source of energy with most risks. Unlike oil, there is no global market, which means supply is more dependent on agreements with states. Hence the need to pay particular attention to security in the supply of gas and its impact on our foreign policy.

In the case of both natural gas and that of electricity, the necessary bilateral and regional agreements must be reached so that our country evolves from being an energy island to being a country of transit. This requires favouring relations with the supplier countries, creating a suitable climate of understanding and common interests.

For the reasons mentioned above, a crucial goal for Spain is the creation of a European energy market which enables a common energy policy for the EU. That would strengthen the position of the Union and of the countries that comprise it against the cartels of producers, be it Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or the one that could be created for gas. At the same time, close monitoring must be carried out of the countries on which we depend for our energy: Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Qatar, Mexico, Libya or Russia, and risks must be diversified, establishing long-term contracts in other areas: Central Asia and perhaps Equatorial Guinea in the future.

As regards nuclear energy, it is necessary to avoid distrust, discrimination and military proliferation, while guaranteeing its civil use. In this respect Spain could support the creation of an agency and/or institution –under UN control– which guaranteed the supply of power stations and inspected their use.

## 4.2 Development cooperation

Development cooperation is one of the basic commitments of the current government, which has placed it at the centre of its international projection as a pillar of the Foreign Ministry. The effort in terms of resources is proving considerable and it is advisable to ensure its continuation in the coming years as it is an essential component of foreign action.

However, cooperation is not just an ethical requirement of the fight against poverty –Millennium Goals, etc.– but also an integral part of the state's foreign and security action as a whole. That is why it is as important to increase the contribution to aid –planned at 0.5% of Gross National Income at the end of the current term of office and at 0.7% at the end of the next one in 2012– as it is to improve the efficiency and transparency of our aid system, as well as the destination and monitoring of results.

In that respect, a priority goal for Spanish cooperation would be to better coordinate the action of the projects and players (central government, autonomous communities, town and city councils, companies, NGOs), improving the effectiveness of aid as a whole and the political impact of Spain as a whole. The goal therefore is to

advance towards a concentration of resources and means in certain geographical and thematic areas.

There is a certain geographical specialization on the part of Spain in work with countries of average income, which because of their cultural and linguistic proximity and economic interests it would be advisable to consolidate in Latin America. Spain must continue to lead the debate on new mechanisms of cooperation with the countries of average income. At the same time, Spain must focus the major portion of traditional cooperation on the less-advanced countries, essentially the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa.

It would be a good idea to reduce sectorial dispersion in the Master Plan and avoid confusion in the definition of the sectors. For the next period, planning should apply suitable criteria for greater definition and harmony with the EU Code of Conduct (whose goal is to improve specialization and coordination by the donor country), as well as limit the number of sectors dealt with by Spain in each country. On the other hand, Spanish cooperation should especially involve the recipients, while maintaining dialogue with the European donor community. It is necessary, in short, that Spain should identify its strengths and opportunities as a donor.

The experience of several decades of cooperation suggests that a nation does not escape underdevelopment by means of multiple projects of minor help directed from abroad, rather with powerful tools capable of enabling the development of material and human resources in certain areas and which have the active involvement of the recipient. For that reason, another goal would be to work in the interests of a new concept of Spanish cooperation in the dual sense of:

- Achieving a consistency of policies between cooperation policy and others (trade, financial, infrastructures, etc.).
- The creation of new tools and policies for development that are different to the traditional ones (for example, cohesion funds and powerful infrastructures for regional integration, budgetary support or the management of remittances via the banks). Spain must lead –as it has been doing– initiatives for these new mechanisms.

Spain should take the initiative in order to progress towards a real European cooperation policy, which could perhaps become a subject of enhanced cooperation. Spain is taking an active role in existing multilateral initiatives as regards.

- Transparency and corruption, with measures to tackle the problems of corruption in the recipient nations.
- Arms sales. In recent years Spain has ranked fifteenth in the world among the world's arms exporters. As has already been said, the law controlling arms sales and dual-purpose equipment is going through parliament and is currently in the Senate.
- Effective integration of aid into the system of international relations. For the first time, the annual international cooperation plan 2007 includes the division of tasks as a concept of complementarity with other donors.

Spain is making a considerable effort to increase its development aid through the channel of multilateral bodies, taking appropriate responsibility in line with the economic weight of the country. This effort must be maintained at the same time as reinforcing monitoring, balancing and the launch of proposals in said bodies. In turn, coordination between multilateral and bilateral cooperation must be improved.

It is within this framework and in this direction of coordinating efforts and giving cooperation a real political boost that these goals of Spanish development cooperation policy –established in the Master Plan (Millennium Goals, reduction of global inequality, promoting sustainable development, promotion of democracy, etc.)– must be achieved.

In view of the humanitarian disasters that strike certain areas of the world periodically, Spain could support and contribute to the establishment of genuine on the ground humanitarian aid bases which cut delays and costs. It is an initiative that could be considered for Central America, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia and could be put forward in the EU.

Strengthen and develop the current policies on:

- Integrating the commitments of the Millennium Goals and the Declaration of Paris into our system of cooperation.
- Promotion of a coherent multilateral policy, adopting a clear stance as a donor.
- Strengthening the capacity of the Office of Secretary of State for International Cooperation (SECI) to manage the coordination of the entire system of Spanish cooperation, enabling it to find better and more effective channels of coordination

among the different ministries and giving it powers alongside the Economy Ministry with regard to international cooperation financial bodies, all this within the department that leads and coordinates the state's foreign action. It is necessary to complete the reform of the AECID and structure the new agency with the rest of the players involved.

- Promoting the creation of the Institute of Development Study at the heart of the United Nations.
- Backing initiatives from the developing countries themselves, such as the proposal of becoming a member of the Alliance against Hunger, promoted by Brazil and of which Spain forms part.
- Ratifying and consolidating participation in and unconditional support of an effective operation of the International Criminal Court which reinforces the instruments of promotion and protection of human rights (the EU's strategy of promotion in the area).
- Promoting a strategy of public information which enables progress on this matter to be seen and greater participation of civil society in defining and implementing policies.
- In order to specify the commitment of adherence to the principles of good humanitarian donation it would be desirable if Spain –like other donors– drew up a plan of execution on this matter.

### 4.3 Migratory flows

The governability of international migrations places increasing importance on the contribution that foreign policy can make. Cooperation among the host countries and the countries of origin and transit is essential to the satisfactory management of international migratory flows. It is a matter of striking the optimum balance between the need of the host countries to meet their demand for labour and reducing the effects of the ageing of the population, on the one hand, and the need for the countries of origin to develop, on the other.

Europe has become one of the prime regions in the world in reception of migratory flows and Spain has established itself as the main host country of the Union in recent

years. In Spain, migratory flows are a relatively recent phenomenon. In the last 10 years almost 2m immigrants have entered our country and they now comprise 10% of the population living in Spain. It is important to establish that immigration in Spain has had and continues to have globally positive effects since it has enabled the demands of the labour market to be met in a period of high growth and low birth rate. Immigrants have occupied many labour-intensive jobs and have raised consumption and social security contributions. In addition, for the most part they have integrated peacefully into our society and culture, enriching it with their ways of life and customs. However the management of immigration is important to ensure an organized flow of people arriving legally in our society who can work and integrate into society.

Growing migratory flows towards a prosperous Europe will probably be a constant feature during the first half of the 21st century. A part of those flows will head for our country, as a destination or in transit. It is obvious that our country cannot tackle this phenomenon of a global scope alone. The management of migratory flows will be carried out in three areas: organizational, bilateral and multilateral, especially at European level. Spain must continue to lead the international fight against the mafias that traffic in immigrants.

### **A) Organizational field**

The treatment of the migratory issue requires active coordination among the different policies and players that comprise our foreign action, combined with a medium and long-term view. The most immediate challenge is to improve the organization of management so that ministries other than the Interior Ministry play a more prominent role.

The above must be linked to a rationalization of management at EU level since only in this way can the contributions of ministerial areas mentioned be strengthened. The area of freedom, security and justice should be consolidated as the first pillar of the Union. It would help if the European Parliament had a more effective voice on these matters and if there were more supervision of the European Court of Justice.

Another vital task is to adopt early-warning instruments in order to detect the possible direction of flows. This means strengthening diplomatic services, consulates and intelligence in different countries of North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and West Africa.

## **B) Bilateral field**

Spain will continue reinforcing global and holistic approaches on migratory issues with third countries. Said approaches will include agreements to strengthen security at the borders of the countries of origin, along with significant increases in the quotas of recruitment at source, new formulas for hiring, such as “circular migration”, and the simplification of bureaucratic procedures.

Spanish cooperation policy must pay particular attention to the countries and areas that are the source of illegal flows. In this respect, it would be advisable to boost investment and aid in infrastructure, labour-intensive projects or training and education projects, which generate more job opportunities in the places of origin or which enable the tailoring of the immigration of immigrants according to the needs of the Spanish market.

But it is clear that in those tasks the states on the Mediterranean and therefore closer to Africa, such as Spain, should have greater backing from the EU, given the common nature of external borders. The Rabat Conference in July 2006 has been a first step in that direction, but there is still a long way to go.

## **C) Multilateral field**

Spain’s priority goal is to achieve a common immigration and asylum policy for the EU, framed within a CFSP. This must fully incorporate the migratory dimension from a new conception not limited to the control and repression of irregular flows and associated unlawful activities. It is positive that there should be a policy which recognizes that cooperation with the countries of origin and transit must offer advantages for both parties, in line with what the European Commission has been developing, especially since 2002.

In this respect, the goal at EU level is to ensure the cooperation of the countries of origin and transit. Offering incentives and compensation directly linked to emigration to third states which cooperate is a more promising and positive direction. Especially:

- Training programmes at source which provide candidates for emigration with the professional qualifications required in the prospective host countries. This is the direction governing the bilateral agreements that the Spanish government has signed with some countries of origin, in particular with countries from Western Africa. These wide-ranging agreements could also include specific development

cooperation programmes, possibly involving emigrants who have returned home. The EU Plans of Action could comprise suitable tools to convey cooperation programmes with countries of origin or transit which combine vocational training with migratory exchange.

- Granting of multiple-entry visas where appropriate to immigrants selected in the cooperation programmes, with a view to facilitating greater movement. That would reduce the fears of permanent settling on the part of the immigrants which the majority of host countries are so reluctant to accept.
- Promotion of joint development programmes which involve immigrants in the development of their countries of origin.
- Facilitating the sending of remittances and reduction of their cost so that they can be genuine motors of growth, investment and development in the countries of origin.
- Multilateral initiatives to compensate countries for the loss of qualified workers (brain drain), such as doctors, nurses, teachers, graduates, etc. which tackle the causes of the migration of this type of people (different to those migrants with no qualifications). Programmes will be promoted to improve training, improve salaries and health and education infrastructures to reduce the incentive to emigrate.
- Raise the resources of the European External Borders Agency (Frontex).

In the area of multilateral bodies, Spain must follow the line of initiatives of the United Nations, the OECD or the World Bank, aimed at ensuring international migrations prove beneficial to both poles, the host and the issuing country. Spain must make its presence felt in the International Organization for Migration (IOM) –which it has finally joined–; pay greater attention to regional frameworks of dialogue and cooperation such as the Puebla Process; and retake the initiative in this field in the Euro-Mediterranean process.

#### **4.4 Environmental challenges: renewable energies**

Sustainable development ceased to be an option some time ago and is now the only alternative if any society is to advance. Spain must actively promote international agreements in the fight against climate change. Without a doubt, this commitment is

also the most appropriate way of reducing our energy dependency on foreign countries and on hydrocarbons and of ensuring the sustainability of our development.

In spite of having aligned with the EU on issues such as the nuclear moratorium, the political debate on sustainability in Spain requires a major boost. Meeting 20% efficiency, 20% renewable energies and 20% fewer CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, from the last European Council (3x20), will be no easy task and still less so to keep in step with the European proposal put to the international community to aim for 30%.

Our country must continue to make a firm commitment to alternative energies: wind, solar, hydrogen, biomass, etc. and should establish agreements in this direction with other countries. Spain meets all the requirements to become a power in this field if it allocates sufficient resources to Research, Development and Innovation. The resource of biomass must be given careful examination so that staple foods such as soya or corn are not exploited as biofuels, generating more poverty than what already exists in the producing countries by putting up their prices. As well as the general reasons that exist for taking decisions in this field, our country should do so for powerful economic reasons if we take into account that tourism is our main source of wealth. The government of Spain should introduce this subject as a priority issue on its foreign action agenda, both in multilateral bodies and in bilateral relations. Spain should:

- Take an active part in the creation of a special committee on climate change promoted by the European Parliament.
- Form an active part of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
- Consolidate the mechanisms for clean development as a priority instrument in development cooperation policy. The commitment of Kyoto + the Marrakech Accords means for Spain the ratified commitment to lend financial and technological support to developing countries using this mechanism.

Apart from global problems, our country has priority environmental areas, in which regional initiatives could be taken:

- In the Mediterranean, which is severely deteriorated, as well as agreements with the coastal countries –France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, etc. Spain should promote and be the headquarters of a major Environmental Institute of the Mediterranean, which investigates and takes care of all these issues and which could implement specific proposals.

- Another priority area should be everything related to maritime traffic in order to prevent the disasters which occur periodically.
- With regard to the rational and ecological use of the seas and oceans, Spain, as the second nation in the world in terms of catches, cannot and must not remain passive in the face of the terrible deterioration of the oceans. It would be important for other fishing powers such as Japan and Russia to collaborate in order to establish a new marine order which preserves and regenerates the seas and oceans.
- In the same way that Spain has launched the Alliance of Civilizations initiative to prevent the clash between peoples and sectarian violence, thought should be given to an alliance in favour of nature which had as its central point the approval on the part of the UN of a code of “rights” for the environment in order to protect it.
- In addition, it is forecast that the adverse impact of climate change will affect the less developed countries and poorer people more severely. This phenomenon will cause a displacement of population from the equator towards more temperate areas and deforestation and desertification will advance on these countries with grave consequences for the planet in terms of food security and water shortages. That is why the environmental factor must be present in the state’s foreign action.

#### **4.5 Cultural and communication projection**

As is clear from what has been said previously, foreign cultural action is a growing dimension of soft power in a world of new information and communication technologies. A priority goal for the coming years should be to transform our country into a major cultural and communication power. We have the linguistic, economic and human tools to do so. Spain is in a very favourable position in sectors such as film, the publishing world, music, art and audiovisuals –means which are not sufficiently employed or promoted by the authorities. Proof of that is the position the Ministry of Culture occupies in the state organization chart from a political and budgetary point of view. Comparing it to France, for example, would illustrate what we mean.

Spain has the chance to become the centre of the world audiovisual industry in Spanish. To be precise, it could lead the creation of an Ibero-American cultural area –in collaboration with the office of the secretary-general for Ibero-America–, following an alliance with Portugal, and promote Spanish and Portuguese jointly. Said Ibero-American cultural and audiovisual area would, by means of joint initiatives, have a

global scope. For example, Spain and Portugal along with Mexico, Brazil and Argentina could lead some initiatives in this respect –a G5 of Ibero-American culture extendable to other countries–. It could begin with an Observatory of Culture with Portuguese and Latin American participation. Spain should also boost the creation of a news channel in Spanish for the entire Spanish-speaking world, including North Africa, the USA or Asia.

The Instituto Cervantes can play an essential role in this respect provided that it is also an instrument of cultural promotion and penetration and not just a centre for teaching Spanish. The Spanish language has to be introduced into the schools of secondary education in each country or it will only reach the elites. For this to happen, Spain must create a major training centre for teachers of Spanish, using the Campus Comillas project and others.

Another major goal is to advance towards better coordination of the state's foreign action in this important field. Much of this action is dispersed among the Culture Ministry, the Education Ministry, the Foreign Ministry etc., as well the autonomous communities. An important element for capturing synergies in the field of cultural action on the part of the autonomous communities would be to involve those with their own language –Catalan, Basque, Galician– in joint cultural projects which offer a plural and modern image of Spain abroad.

In the field of audiovisuals and cinema, Spain, along with Portugal and countries from Ibero-America –Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and others– should promote the creation of large production companies and, above all, distribution companies of films and television series to compete with those of Anglo-Saxon origin. The Spanish-speaking world meets all the conditions for becoming a major area of production and consumption of cultural goods in many diverse fields.

In order to create and extend this large area of Ibero-American culture and communication, the Ministry of Culture should accentuate its international projection in close collaboration with the Foreign Ministry.

## 5. The means of foreign action

The success or failure of the policies that comprise foreign action depends on three key elements which we can call strategic. These three elements are: the organizational structure of foreign action; the human and material resources (foreign service) present in our country and abroad; and the execution and control procedures. Therefore, our basic goal has to be to equip ourselves with those essential elements that make foreign action possible. Without them our country will not be able to tackle the global challenges of the coming years or attain the political, social and cultural weight it deserves on the basis of its economic power. But there are habits that are difficult to break. We are facing one of the greatest challenges as a country, a challenge which requires a fresh approach and great political determination from the pinnacle of government.

### 5.1 New decision-taking mechanisms

With regard to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, a change of mentality and reorientation are required. The Foreign Ministry should become the leading and coordinating body of a network of players that participate in the design of coherent, coordinated and effective foreign action. Said players are many, both public and private: ministries and agencies, foreign, defence, trade and industry, culture, work, AECID, Spanish Institute for External Trade (ICEX), the autonomous communities, town and city councils, cities, companies or NGOs. It must be acknowledged that the Foreign Ministry lost its monopoly on the projection of Spain abroad quite some time ago now. To make this change possible it will be necessary to introduce incen-

tives for cooperation in diverse fields, such as European policy, immigration, development cooperation, image abroad, foreign presence or international treaties.

- As far as the necessary strengthening of the state's foreign action is concerned, the appropriate governmental level of the foreign minister should be considered in order to meet the need for more effective and coordinated "joined-up" foreign action on the issues that affect it and the different players that take part. This would give foreign action greater relative political weight, in line with countries such as the USA, Germany, Italy or Great Britain.

With regard to the improvement of collective decision-taking bodies, coordination of foreign action can be done on two planes:

- Via an effective Council of the State's Foreign Action chaired by the prime minister or by whoever he delegates it to with participation, where appropriate, of the autonomous communities and other foreign action players.
- Via the strict governmental coordination of a Delegate Committee working more periodically and flexibly, in the style of the GDC of economic affairs.

With regard to the improvement of coordination and decision-taking with parliament and the autonomous communities, it will be necessary:

- To improve the quality of parliamentary control over foreign and defence policy, by means of specific reporting that is accessible to the public or with more appearances of heads of embassies in specific countries to keep watch over coordination. The assessment and quality control of foreign action could be made to depend on parliament: bank of good practice, or impact measurement. In the case of European policy, it also requires the specific implementation of the early-warning system, in compliance with the new principle of subordination.

## 5.2 Reform of the foreign service

Our country has a foreign service that is clearly insufficient. For example, we have fewer diplomatic officials and a smaller budget than the Netherlands or Sweden, approximately half those of Germany or the United Kingdom and a little over a third of those of France. But above all, Spain has a deficiency in its structure of Analysis, Planning and Forecasting for the monitoring of areas of geographic and thematic

interest and of specific countries and strategic planning in the medium and long term compared to other European members such as France or the United Kingdom, which do indeed have specific units of dozens of experts dedicated to these tasks.

The present government announced that one of its priorities was to reform the foreign service in order to remedy this situation. However, the report prepared by the Interministerial Committee for the Reform of the Foreign Service is clearly insufficient for meeting the challenges and achieving the goals. What was going to be a comprehensive reform amounted to a modest internal reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Subsequently, this crucial issue was buried for reasons of domestic political agenda. Now it requires a new framework law on the foreign service which leaves parliament with broad consensus among the political parties and among the government and autonomous communities.

Inflexibility in the processes of selection, promotion and retraining of diplomats (entrance exams, diplomatic school) is having two very negative effects which concern the whole of society. On the one hand, it demotivates diplomatic officials, affecting the quality of our projection abroad; on the other, it causes a constant drain of qualified human resources who are not civil servants which is not taken advantage of for foreign action.

- A profound reform of the admissions system for the diplomatic profession is required, as is a reorientation of diplomatic schooling towards ongoing training, especially in languages of countries of strategic interest (Arabic, Chinese) and new technologies.
- One goal to achieve therefore is the implementation of a “revolving doors” system in the style of the Anglo-Saxon countries, consisting of the flexible incorporation of non-civil servant expert personnel (from universities, companies, foundations, NGOs) into Foreign Ministry posts according to the criteria of aptitude, especially in the areas of communication, culture, intelligence, or in specific subjects likely to form part of Foreign Ministry missions. This move would enrich not only foreign action but also the rest of society. This can be done by means of a relaxing of temporary hiring for *ad hoc* positions and by opening up tasks to non-civil servant personnel. In the same way, it is also important to promote a steady interflow between the civilian and military sectors.
- It is necessary to identify and, where appropriate, cover countries of interest to Spain in which there is presently no diplomatic and/or consular representation or they are covered indirectly and where funding is scarce. Our network of embassies

and consulates must reflect the geopolitical reality and the interests of Spain and be efficient.

- Likewise, the organizational structure of diplomatic missions must be changed. On the one hand, it is necessary to move towards operating in a network with less hierarchical inflexibility and capable of making the most of rapid access to information and its transmission, speeding up anticipation and response capability. On the other, diplomats must above all act as “antennas” of the changes and to do that it is necessary to increase direct contact with the civil society of the country of origin and with the Spanish community in said country.
- Spain should create “mobile crisis teams” with *ad hoc* personnel, according to the circumstances, from different embassies or ministries, according to qualifications or knowledge, as well as the nature of the crisis.

The media are the “fourth estate” of politics and often the first, in that they shape the perception of events and set the political agenda for the public. In Spain there is insufficiency in the communication field on issues relating to foreign action. If we mean for citizens to acquire a culture on foreign policy –which affects their daily lives– it is important that information flows steadily, that decisions are more transparent and are explained via ministerial web pages, television, radio and regular press conferences.

The reorientation of the Spanish foreign service must foster exchange of information between the state and the autonomous communities.

- This would allow the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to organize its limited technical and human resources abroad and it would enable the autonomous communities to secure the collaboration of the foreign service, making the official trips and contacts abroad of their representatives more productive.
- Thought could be given to the possible use of civil servants from some autonomous communities as liaisons with the foreign action of those autonomous communities.
- It would be good idea to promote the development of a shared public diplomacy on the image of Spain and the compatibility of state and autonomous community foreign action which explains the interests of Spain’s foreign policy to citizens.

With regard to the future European Foreign Action Service, reaffirmed in the recent Treaty of Lisbon, Spain should lead the debate on its commencement and carry out changes to its foreign service in synergy with that.

Another goal which concerns the foreign service is to obtain greater presence and influence in international bodies. Spain does not occupy a place in international bodies to match its economic and even political weight, not in the United Nations, the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and still less so in the G8, to which it does not belong. The launch of an initiative like the Alliance of Civilizations, or our support of the reform of the United Nations, must make us more ambitious about our presence. Nowadays, Spain has a GDP greater than that of Canada and it should be a goal in the coming years to take part in a reformed G-forum.

- Being satisfied with the idea that it would be in our interests to take part in a G3 (USA-Canada/Japan/EU) is not very realistic since, as is already happening, the G8 would become the G12 or G13 because nothing can be done without including China, India, Brazil and South Africa. Spain cannot remain outside this architecture because its interests are now global.
- This takes place in spite of the fact that there has been a spectacular increase in Spain's contributions to international development bodies, above all to UN bodies and agencies. In 2007, Spain established the biggest fiduciary fund in the entire UN system with 700m dollars for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This must be accompanied by a greater Spanish presence in said bodies.

## **6. Conclusion: a shift in the Spanish political agenda**

From what has been stated so far it is possible to draw the following conclusions to be taken into account when tackling the shift that Spanish foreign policy requires:

1. The way in which Spain projects itself abroad in the 21st century must start from the premise that the old distinction between “domestic policy” and “foreign policy” has blurred. This is the result of both globalization and our recent political, social and economic development, which has brought to the fore new players which influence how Spain projects itself abroad: autonomous communities, companies or NGOs.
2. The time of traditional “foreign policy” as such has come to an end, giving way to foreign action which comprises the economy, defence, culture and society. For that reason our basic goal is to achieve greater and better coordination among the diverse policies and players, forming all-round foreign action. This commitment involves a reform of the decision-taking mechanisms and the bodies that implement those decisions, as well as of their place in the state architecture.
3. The formulation of robust and sustained foreign action must be based on a coherent view of our country, of its goals and the place it wishes to occupy in the world. In our approach to that foreign action we should avoid the misleading and self-interested distinction between “soft power” and “hard power”. In order to become a major democratic power, Spain needs the EU, to which the fate of our country is firmly tied. It is a priority interest that it should become an autonomous global player with an ESDP of its own, capable of managing crises and being a decisive factor in peace, development and democracy in the world. To

fulfil that task the EU must have “power” to do so and this power is both “soft” and “hard”, according to the time and circumstances. Assuming that the EU remained only as a “soft” and/or “civil” power, it would always depend in one way or another on the “strong” powers and would lose strategic autonomy. Spain should make a firm commitment to the emergence of an autonomous Europe.

4. The foreign action of the state must be devised so as to rise to the major challenges facing us in a globalized world and these major challenges are not strictly geographical, rather thematic or transversal. Thus, some geographical areas mean the activation of certain “joined-up” policies in a more intensive way than others; for example, the USA (security and investment), the EU (agricultural, monetary or defence policy) or Africa (immigration, development cooperation). But no geographical area now escapes our foreign action, which starts from a globalized context. On the basis of this new reality, it is necessary to organize the policies and resources of foreign action.
5. As has already been said, Europe is an essential part of Spanish policy on most issues. The goal is to act with a high political profile in European political construction. Spain must promote initiatives for the full Europeanization of essential policies for our country, such as energy and migration. We must commit to the CFSP and the ESDP via our integration into the first gear or nucleus that is formed in order to establish “permanent structured cooperation” and to try to achieve a common European defence capability that complements NATO.
6. In Latin America, Spain should raise its political profile and play hard in the battle of ideas for a development model based on the virtuous formula of sustained growth plus cohesion plus democracy. The future of Latin America is decisive for us and we must promote a model distanced both from neoliberalism and “populism”. It is in Spain’s interests to support, from the EU, the contribution to Latin American regional integration on the basis of our own successful experience of our integration into Europe. In this respect, Spain should lead a consistent initiative in the creation and financing of a Regional Development Fund along with the EU –without ruling out the future participation of the USA– similar to those that have worked in Europe with the medium-term goal of creating an Ibero-American area of social cohesion. Spain would gain weight if it could assemble a genuine Ibero-American Community of Nations alongside Portugal in a strategic alliance with the EU.
7. In the Maghreb, we cannot afford to remain on the sidelines in the leadership of projects of Mediterranean cooperation and integration. Spain must reconsider

the achievements and remaining challenges of the Barcelona Process it led in 1995, harmonizing said projects with its interests and bringing on board European members from the north such as Germany and the United Kingdom. It is necessary to put a stop to the current European protectionism in certain sectors and give way to full Euro-Maghrebi business integration. Spain should approach said processes of political and economic transition in a comprehensive and coherent way: growth and democratization, economic and political change, must go hand in hand.

8. The current military approach employed by the US administration in the Middle East and the unconditional support of Israel only aggravate the situation. Spain and the EU must distance themselves and offer more realistic and fruitful channels in the long term, like the one tested in Lebanon, with increasing involvement from the United Nations. We must understand that if we invade Arab countries and support corrupt regimes, the Islamist masses will become ever more radical and terrorism will spread. The challenge facing us is to offer help from outside in integrating the Islamist parties into stable governments by means of incentives such as real policies for development and diplomatic mediation.
9. Spain must be pragmatic with the USA. The goal is to redress the balance as far as possible in a relationship that is currently one-sided by working on two major fronts. Firstly, redefining our security in a European sense by means of a commitment to the ESDP and having the horizon of a review of the bilateral defence agreement and a reconsideration of NATO missions. Secondly, actively seeking areas of cooperation with the USA, especially in Latin America, where we have a comparative advantage and we can influence the direction of the next administration's policies. Only in this way can we aspire to becoming partners and not subordinates.
10. Our country's main strategic problems are connected to the process of development in Africa. Key issues for our future, such as energy, security or emigration are related to the neighbouring continent. Spain alone cannot meet the challenges that immense continent presents. It is therefore in its interest to lead strategic EU-Africa relations of fair trade and investment and back autonomous security mechanisms for the region.
11. Asia is an immense territory of new opportunities for Spain if we are capable of making up for lost time. The possibilities of increasing our economic and cultural relations are enormous and we must make the most of them. It is not a job that can be done in a day and we must look beyond the short term. Asia requires

a long-term view, sustained action, constant political relations, an independent approach and action. A strategic alliance of Spain and the EU with countries such as China, India or Japan (not forgetting Indonesia or Vietnam) is vital to our future and that of humanity. More than half of the world's population will live on that continent in the coming years. However, we should not forget that our influence in countries such as China or India will depend above all on our political and economic weight within the EU and the degree of autonomy it manages to achieve. For peace and stability in the world it is essential that China has a Europe that looks to it as a partner whose help is needed to tackle the pressing problems of mankind and not as a strategic enemy of the future.

12. The issue of security needs a new global approach. Preventive war must be countered with preventive intelligence. This requires powerful and coordinated intelligence tools, integrated intelligence communities, advanced technologies and, above all, the gradual eradication of the breeding grounds in which violent fundamentalism germinates and thrives. The experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that terrorism is not combated by invading or bombing countries as it has the opposite effect to what is desired. Spain –and the EU– should help to create the right conditions for an effective intelligence community, with the participation of some Arab countries, while contributing to the economic and democratic development of those countries.
13. As a nation dependent on traditional sources of energy, Spain has a major flank exposed in its energy security. Our country must redouble its efforts in the field of renewable energies, contributing to the creation of an integrated energy space in the EU, diversify its supplies of gas and oil and pay great attention to our relations with current and future providers (Central Asia and others). Careful thought must be given to the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear energy, as well as that based on the agricultural production of biofuels such as ethanol.
14. Countries fail to escape poverty and the vicious circle that this generates by means of micro-development cooperation or by means of the work of NGOs. This work is essential and valuable for mitigating the most dramatic effects of poverty, but both Spain and the EU should introduce new tools into this issue. While it is necessary, it is not just a question of achieving a sizeable percentage of GDP devoted to cooperation, but also of applying effective tools which break the cycle of poverty. The virtuous circle of development requires heavy investment in material resources –infrastructures– and human resources –training, fair trade and a minimally efficient state–. Only when there is sustained growth –several decades– clearly above the growth in population and the wealth produced

is distributed evenly, will nations begin to reduce their rates of poverty and build a market which will in turn stimulate investment. Spain and the EU should contribute with resources –such as the cohesion and structural funds used in Europe itself– to create these material and human resources without which development is difficult. This task should be focused mainly on areas of Africa and Latin America. The strategic goal would be to create Euro-American and Euro-Mediterranean areas of social cohesion.

15. Development is the only way of ensuring the control of migratory flows and their contribution to the growth of countries of origin and host countries. Historically speaking, migrations have been decisive factors of growth –the USA in the 1920s and Europe in the 1950s would be inexplicable without immigrants–. The challenge for the foreign action of the state is the progressive materialization of a genuine EU common immigration policy capable of securing the cooperation of the countries of origin and transit by means of incentives and compensation that go beyond simple control and repression of the flows.
16. We are becoming increasingly aware that halting the destruction of the environment is perhaps the most pressing problem facing us –an issue which has a global dimension from the outset since the ecosystem is a single and interrelated phenomenon–. The possible solution in view of the present deterioration, while it logically has a national dimension, will be only be successful via foreign action of a global nature. Spain should be in the vanguard of the promptest action, both in the European framework and in the United Nations. Environmental issues must become a priority concern of foreign action. Spain is in a position to play a prominent role in this field provided that it can effectively perform its own duties.
17. The Spanish language is a powerful tool of the foreign action of the state and should be more so in the future. However, it is not enough to expand the Instituto Cervantes or perform occasional acts of cultural promotion. In the short term, the goal should be the creation of an integrated Ibero-American cultural community capable of promoting culture in the Iberian languages, both consolidated cultural manifestations and the emerging ones, both those in traditional media and in those that are disseminated via new technologies. The audiovisual area must be a priority.
18. The success or failure of the policies mentioned so far and which make up foreign action depends on three strategic elements which should be matters of consensus: the organizational structure of foreign action, the foreign service and the

procedures of execution and control. Without these three elements, our country will not be able to rise to the global challenges of the coming years or attain political, social and cultural weight in line with its economic power.

19. A certain reorientation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation would be required so that at the same time as it sets a political course, it acts as a coordinator of a network of players, both public and private, which can participate in the design of coherent, coordinated and effective foreign action. It could be a good idea to consider the appropriate governmental level of the Foreign Affairs Ministry so that it can coordinate the foreign action of the state as a whole.
20. Spain does not have the human, material or technological resources to be able to carry out foreign action befitting its position. Its backwardness in this respect is concerning. For countries such as Spain –heavily decentralized and with important global interests– having a powerful instrument for managing and planning foreign action is vital. A genuine reform of the Foreign Service is required –on the one hand, improving the selection and training of diplomatic personnel, and on the other, establishing a “revolving doors” system which allows non-civil servant personnel from other administrations (the autonomous communities), business or academia to come on board temporarily, providing very valuable human resources.
21. A country’s influence rests on two essential factors: its economic and cultural weight and its military capability. It is essential to be aware that Spain can only compensate for its evident limitations as a medium-sized power via powerful diplomatic deployment, constant political activity of launching initiatives on different issues. That will require a clear vision of our interests on the basis of the trends in global politics. These initiatives must be carried out in the European sphere mainly –contributing to the European Foreign Service from the outset– but also on the bilateral and multilateral planes.
22. Spain’s weight in international bodies does not match up to its position as the world’s eighth economic power, to its growing contribution to the United Nations coffers and its specialized bodies; to the Alliance of Civilizations, the deployment of its troops in different theatres of conflict or major effort in international cooperation. Spain should lobby for a place on a reformed G8 or at least in the extended G-forum and perhaps it should promote proposals, along with Portugal, for a Spanish-Portuguese presence in certain bodies. What is urgent is full coordination of the European countries in the UN Security Council by means of the setting up of a “UN Euro-group” which increases our weight in that important body.

23. From all that stated above it can be gathered that Spain is staking its future on that area of intersection between “domestic” and “foreign” policy we have called foreign action. There are habits that it is difficult to break and that is why we are facing one of the greatest challenges as a country –challenge which requires a fresh approach and great political determination from the very pinnacle of government. It is necessary to become aware of this new reality, build an argument that changes policies and conveys to citizens the many ways in which foreign affairs directly or indirectly determine our well-being and freedom.

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