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FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS speech

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I am very honoured to be here. Thank you very much for this opportunity to speak in English because I am sure that it will be much more successful this way round than if I try the other way round.

I have about forty minutes to try to convince you, this mixed audience of academics and practitioners, of the virtues of what we in the Universities call Foreign Policy Analysis. Probably some of the things that I will say will not be news to you, they will be simply presented in a slightly different language. But I am convinced that we need a systematic study of foreign policy from an analytical perspective, whether we are academics trying to fit in an approach to the subject with more general international relations, practitioners seeking to understand the world but realizing that perhaps the tools that we have been given traditionally are not enough, or citizens who want to understand these great events that from time to time crash into their lives, but most of the time are terra incognita to the average man or woman in the street.

I start with the conviction that I had when I entered the profession thirty years ago, as an historian influenced by studying the two world wars. Foreign policy is a crucial area of human life and particularly of political life. It is not an esoteric area of speciality that has to be left or should be left only to small group of technical experts. But it is difficult to convince people at all levels of this observation and even if they agree with it in principle translating the idea into practice is of course a very different matter, whether it is in the university or in the political sphere.

Let me say a little about the history of the study of foreign policy to begin with. Foreign policy has been studied for thousands of years in one way or other (for example the ancient Greeks). It was not really called foreign policy until modern times. For the most part we talked about strategy or diplomacy. People like Machiavelli or Kant referred to 'politics'. They did not make a distinction

between foreign policy and ordinary policy and of course in languages other than English, probably your own, the same word is used for both policy and politics (*politique* in French) which is an interesting linguistic difference, given that in English there is a distinction. The English assume that politics is about conflict, and that policy is about strategy or technique. I would be interested to hear about your own cultural take on that.

From the 18th century onwards we started to talk about foreign policy as a special area. The Royal Household tended to develop secretaries for external policy in one way or another. From the 19th century on, foreign policy was mostly examined in terms of diplomatic history, as the universities developed the professional study of social science. Yet because the social sciences were new, and initially focussed on economics and sociology more than political science, foreign policy was one of the last areas to be studied scientifically. In most of the 19th century and early 20th century foreign policy was thought of in terms of how to form strategy according to special rules that were different from the rules of a domestic politics that was increasingly becoming democratized. And normal politics therefore stopped at the water's edge (as we say in Britain, because we are an island country), but certainly it stopped at the frontier.

In the 19th century there was also a second version of the story: trade was important to foreign policy and trade was the way in which democracy was related to external policy. Writers like Cobden and Bright thought peace could be achieved through growing trade relations, since the people were more interested in peace and trade than they were in war. So foreign policy could be used for idealist purposes; it could make the world better if it fostered what we would now call interdependence.

But in my view this was simply the reversal of the realist orthodoxy: it concentrated on power without asking whether we can change the world. Idealism assumes that foreign policy can be used to overturn the existent order and create a new system of law and international institutions. But then came the collapse of the legal order in the 1930s and the return of realism with the wars against fascism. The conflict between communism and liberal democracy which produced the cold war reinforced this trend.

It was only in the 1950s that social science came truly to international relations. The subject had started after the first world war with the first department

in the world in Wales, soon followed by others in the U. S. A and in London. At that time the study of international relations focussed on mostly law and institutions. Foreign policy was not seen as a separate category deserving of scientific analysis, and it was only in the 1950s, after the obviously disastrous mistakes of the two world wars, and then the arrival of nuclear weapons, that the realization dawned that if you made a mistake in foreign policy it would have savage consequences for millions of people and could indeed lead to a global catastrophe.

The need for a technical understanding of nuclear matters, led to a new game of chess emerging called nuclear deterrence theory. But intelligent observers were always saying: no, it is not just about technical matters, it is about politics as well: You have to join strategy together with the understanding of diplomacy and foreign policy. But after that point there was still a special study of diplomacy: academies existed to study the techniques to advise diplomats on International law and on the administration of diplomacy. But in the 1950s the subject we call foreign policy analysis emerged because American social scientists said: we need to study decision-making, we need to know how decisions are made, to go behind the curtain to see the realities of the operations of power in the area of foreign policy (FP). And they came up with models of decision-making which were based in systems theory with its concepts of inputs, outputs, feedback, and the environments of decision-making. They were largely behaviourists at that time. They believed that FP could be studied as you might study the behaviour of the butterfly in the museum or in the laboratory. They did also, however, look increasingly at what we now call the domestic sources of FP. Historians had been considering particular decisions for some time in this light. But in talking analytically about the domestic sources of FP you open up the possibility of discussing public opinion. There is the possibility of looking at pressure groups, national divisions within the country, the rule of federal states, ethnic conflict, the role of the media and so on.

Not many of these things were actually being done in the 1950s but new possibilities were suddenly being achieved and the Americans in particular were keen on something they called comparative foreign policy. They argued that we should generalise about FP, for example on the basis that certain kinds of FP are carried out by certain kinds of country. Alternatively, we can say that if there is turmoil inside a country this can have certain consequences for its FP. Because the whole point of social science is to make generalizations or laws. So far we probably have only got one law of FP behaviour which is the famous democratic peace theory

viz, democracies do not fight each other. There is a huge academic literature on this subject. The hypothesis that democracies are always peaceful is controversial. And practitioners are quick to say, if democracies do not fight each other, we must democratise the world. The more countries become democracies, the more we make a peaceful world. It sounds a very good idea. Anyway foreign policy analysis (FPA) developed in the 1950s and spread to Britain in particular in the 1960s. The French took some interest, but in a slightly more traditional way, closer to the historians.

At this time the focus was on the foundations of national FP, using analytical categories of FPA. Since then, however, there has been the turning of the wheel. One of the things which is most inevitable about social science (and also one of the most regrettable) is that intellectual fashion rules, so that we are all eager for the latest big idea, whether from Fukuyama or Robert Cooper. We want to know what is the latest key idea which will apparently unlock the door of our understanding of the world, and we tend too much to move on quickly from things that are just becoming solid in their achievements.

In natural science there are bodies of knowledge which have been achieved and broadly accepted. It is more difficult in social science, which is more political and generates ideological disagreements. It is not so exact. We cannot be sure that X is true, or even that W is false. But still there are literatures which have built up to help us to understand the world and I want to show now that FPA is one of those bodies of literature which have some real achievements to its name, and which we can use now in analysing particular countries and FP problems. It could be very helpful to draw on this work if you do not already have a special tradition in that regard, as seems to be the case in Spain.

The wheel of fashion has turned and in the 1980s and 1990s FPA was not fashionable. It was regarded as yesterday's approach and for various reasons, some good, some bad. The first reason was antagonism to states in general and therefore FP was seen as anachronistic. States were on the way out, because the world was changing, then the individual nation state could no longer achieve its goals in domestic policy or in FP. The world was too interdependent and the state was under challenge from multinational corporations and other actors. It seemed to follow that unless you were a superpower, states in a special category, there was not much that you could do. And it was very interesting that we lost the concept of the great power about this time. The great power is an idea which recurs

throughout modern history, especially in the 18th and the 19th century. In the post 1950 era we only had superpowers and middle range powers. In between there is a black hole where we used to have great powers, because there is such a gap between the superpowers and the rest. So countries like France, Spain, Britain and Italy were middle range powers. And that is a subtle indication of the fact that people thought that it was not possible any longer to achieve much with the single national state.

There was also a move at the normative level, that is not just in terms of how you describe the world but how you thought the world ought to be. There was a strong movement in favour of universal values, not national values: human rights, that came to be called cosmopolitan democracy in the 1990s with my ex colleague at LSE, David Held and others writing about globalisation. And the belief that if you were going to act politically you were to act for the people of the world, not just for your citizens. Andrew Linklater, another major theorist, wrote a book called "Men and citizens in international relations" using Immanuel Kant to show the tension in international relations between on the one hand men and women, as individuals and loyalty to natural societies as citizens. This tension occurs in international relations all the time. Very few of us care only for our fellow citizens or care only for the world. We have to make a balance of things. And at that time the conclusion was that FP had nothing to say about this subject. We have to think about cosmopolitan democracy or national interest. That is the choice. And ironically FPA became associated with realism which was increasingly unfashionable, seen as morally and intellectually bankrupt by many people. Why is this ironic?. Because FPA is a reaction against realism. It says realism treats the state as a black box and it is not interested in opening the black box. But we must open the black box. We must observe the things going on inside the state machines, or inside domestic society, that affect FP. So FP is pluralist and it is at odds with realism, which assumes unitary decision making process with people making rational-actor choices about state strategy. So for FPA to be called realist and to be discarded with realism was ironic and mistaken.

A further reason for the decline of FPA was that in international relations theory at this time, there was a dominance of structuralist explanations. These were of two kinds: one ironically was still realist, but it was not the classical realism of Machiavelli, with a place for the human being. It was the neorealism of Waltz, the structural realism which said that the only way you can explain state behaviour is by understanding the capabilities of the state in the structure of the international

system. There is a balance of power, which compels you to assess the opposition, the capabilities you have and then calculate your choices. But the system will decide outcomes. It is not easy trying to go against the system. This is a deterministic view of national FP. And American International Relations scholarship is dominated by neorealism, mixed with rational choice analysis from economics. So the stress is on game theory, using ever more sophisticated ways of thinking about choice. FPA is the antithesis of this kind of formalism.

The other kind of structuralism which was powerful at this time was very different to neo-realism. It was globalisation theory, a very powerful idea at the end of the cold war, saying that the market dominated, that politics was increasingly affected by economics, that our lives were affected by the growing single international market and that we have to adapt and to cope with globalisation. The social democratic reaction of David Held and Anthony Giddens stressed cosmopolitan democracy, the need to organize in pressure groups across national frontiers, to empathize with human rights and to try to build up the United Nations or other international organizations. In Spain and other European States the conclusion is drawn that the EU is the best way of coping with globalisation. The EU then becomes a political project as well as an economical one.

So far I have been too simplistic in talking about FPA and have neglected some very important questions and the scholarship which has been achieved over the last 20 or 30 years. There are some good reasons to be critical of FPA mostly at the philosophical level: if you put decision-making at the centre of your picture, you are making an ontological judgement about what is important, you are saying that decision-making counts more than structures. You are focusing your attention on individuals, on bureaucracy, maybe on political parties. It is a pluralist view of the world and it does not allow you to think about more long-term structural and historical features. My own view, however, is that we can adapt FPA to take into account these features. Perhaps, on the other hand, it is too positivistic, too behaviourist, in thinking that we can study the world and scientifically understand the processes that work, when many post-modernist analysts that say the world is what we make of it. Alexander Wendt, a leading American constructivist, said when talking about international politics, that anarchy *is what we make of it*. So FPA in studying very carefully all the operations of the bureaucracy and political processes might miss this underlying dimension of ideas. I do not think it has to, as shown by the work of David Campbell, an Australian scholar, who says FP is an important way of achieving a certain

dominant idea, so that he would analyse Western policy through NATO as a way not so much of analysing a political process as of identifying certain key concepts or assumptions. And here language becomes very important. This is the main current approach to international politics, in Europe, and because of the fashionable move away from states from FP, and from things national there was a neglect of very important literatures on decision-making, on the psychological processes of FP, and on the interplay between the external and domestic environments – the latter despite the relevance to constructivism of ideas such as those of Harold and Margaret Sprout, who made the distinction between the operational environment, and the psychological environment.

The Sprouts said you could make policies in the psychological environment, but they had to be implemented in the operational environment. So if you had, as Hitler did, the view that he could create a thousand year Reich in his head, he could not remake the world as he wished. He had to face the limits of the operational environment, as Napoleon had done on the road to Moscow in the winter of 1812. This is a simple but powerful distinction. The current situation in the early part of the 21st century is that the wheel has turned yet again. Happily in my view, although in part for a very unhappy reason, 9-11 has had a big impact on the academic world as well as on international politics.

It is a sad but an inevitable thing that political science follows, not just intellectual fashions but big events as well. In American political science when developments in the EEC seemed to be negative, everybody lost interest in European integration. Then suddenly, when the single market and currency were on everybody's lips, writing surged once again about European integration. In the same way, after 9-11 FP became important again. Just as FP should have been neglected before, so one should not go to the extreme that we now neglect globalisation. We need both of these things to understand the world. I wrote my recent book and other colleagues have also been trying to re-establish the importance of FP. The fact that we have a meeting like this with 25 interested people from Spain, and of all generations, is itself an indication that FP is seen as an interesting and important intellectual and political problem again. It is not just an historical or technical issue only of interest to a small minority. We must thus try to establish the analysis of FP in that middle area between structuralist determinist views of the world which emphasize long-term factors, the environments we are all affected by which shape our lives economically, politically, and ideologically, the

voluntary end of the spectrum where we give importance to individuals. So many people in Europe said 'if only Kerry could win in the election, the world would be different'. Well, he did not win, so maybe the world will not be different. Maybe the world would not have been different if he had won. That is what we analysts must do. We must say how much difference things like personality make, that party makes, that context or period makes and so on. So there is a spectrum between the individualist explanations and structuralist explanations, and it seems to me that FPA should find a middle ground trying to link the levels together, intellectually and practically.

In my book I talk about what I call the *changing politics of foreign policy*. I do not suggest that suddenly we are living in a completely new world from that of Woodrow Wilson or Lloyd George. Rather, I want to say that in the world there are some continuities and some important changes. In this context the important changes are: there is now an increasing public interest in FP. It is no longer left to the specialists. There is a degree of democratisation but that's much more doubtful. We must discuss whether real processes of democratic accountability are developing in this area, but there is certainly more domestic involvement in FP activity and therefore there is more polarization of FP. Because FP matters it is now acceptable to have party disagreement on FP. In my country for many years it was thought to be actually immoral to challenge your country's FP because it would undermine national unity and weaken the position of His Majesty's Government in his dealings with France or Russia or wherever. Now it is perfectly normal.

FP is just like every other policy area: education, health, justice, whatever might be. We have arguments about it, political arguments, and that is right in a healthy democracy. It does not mean to say that we are traitors to our country. In fact we are probably more loyal to our country because we want to have a serious debate on FP, which is thus subjected to quality control. You would not be happy just to leave air traffic control to the experts. You want to make sure that there are procedures put in place that make sure that they do not become too over-confident. They are aware of their responsibility. FP make us be aware of the responsibilities of government.

Multilateralism is another important change. Increasingly FP takes place not just in terms of bilateral diplomacy or the balance of power, or unilateral politics, but in a multi-frame world of organized cooperation, intensive as in the

European Union, and looser cooperation as with United Nations or the OSCE in Vienna. It is very rarely that we engage now in wholly self-regarding policy. But that does not mean that we must now abandon national FP. That has just changed the nature of the debate about national FP and one of the most interesting paradoxes for me is the emergence of new traditions in national FP, new confidence in national FP in countries like Spain and Germany and Italy, that for historical reasons have suppressed the idea of national FP for many decades. Yet the choice is between the national and the collective. At present the game is both national and collective, and it is a very interesting development.

There are three important general questions that I want to sketch before going on to finish what I have to say by listing seven detailed questions about the different kind of politics in FP. The three general questions are, first of all: What is FP? My own definition is that FP is not just what foreign ministries do, or what we call FP. Rather, it is the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor. In other words, not just of states; you can just have a FP of a sub-national actor. And that is my fourth new element: new actors have arisen in the FP world; some of the official external relations are certainly conducted by non-state actors. Some, it is not just one actor. Its "official" because FP is not just what we are doing now, what we do as individuals, or what the banks do in their external relations. A FP has to be on behalf of a community, have an official role and thus be a political actor in international relations.

The second question is: What is FP for? I am not at all in favour of using the national interest as an analytical concept. One party says the national interest in Britain should be more integrated in Europe. The other party says we should be more independent. How do we evaluate these positions? Just through ideology and preferences? If we ask what functions FP performs on behalf of the state or community it is a more analytical way forward than the ideological way of approaching the subject. The concept of national interest has little scientific value. Everyone, of courses, wishes to protect the state as a territory plus the safety and security of its people against threats. Yet increasingly in the modern world FP is about promoting prosperity, and negotiating a stable world, because we mostly recognize that if we pursue our interests in an unstable world, even if we are the USA, we might be in serious difficulties.

In the EU we are tending to see FP as serving now a wider regional group than just the state. We are increasing the cooperation within Europe, providing

more facilities for all our citizens. We also want to project our collective identity abroad, to provide collective security and to protect the environment, which we cannot do alone. The third question asks who is FP for? This takes me back to the original distinction between men and citizens. Is FP just about making life better to Spaniards? Or do we have some responsibility also for other people? If so, who are those other people: Europeans, the citizens of the world, the poor? Where do our responsibilities lie? In Spain, this very city suffered the most dramatic moment in modern FP for a democracy, with the 11MARCH tragedies, the election following so rapidly and the huge debate about whether that could have been influenced by international events, deliberately and cynically. The debate raged between the government and the opposition.

In terms of my seven kinds of politics, the first is the politics of collective FP. We here in the EEC are trying to make a collective European FP without destroying our national FP. Maybe some people want a single European FP. For the moment we are left with the problem how to make a collective FP and we know that the tensions between the member states represent real politics. We still have divisions. My own country was very concerned about the situation in Zimbabwe. But we try to create a coalition of unity behind the British position against Zimbabwe and it proved impossible to hold that coalition together. It is the politics of coalitions in making FP that is very interesting. We have lots of coordination within the United Nations to think about, or in the Atomic Energy Agency in dealing with the Iran question. It is not just an European problem.

The second is the politics of trying to construct an international order. If we want a stable sophisticated international system and not an old-fashioned anarchy, how do we construct it? What is our attitude towards international law? How much national sacrifice should we make for the collective good? But we cannot agree on the collective good. That is the problem. We have different views about the good life at the international level, with particular disagreements between Americans and Europeans, to say nothing of China and Russia. How far should we go for universalism through international law? Or how far should we concentrate on regionalism in trying to build up a sophisticated international system within our own regional neighbourhood? We do not know how far Europe extends. How far should it go into the Middle east or Eastern Europe? How far do we have special responsibilities to our alliance friends, even responsibilities to these people who seem our enemies? But they are still part of the international system. The trouble is that alliances seem to create groups we used to call in the 19th century

"Barbarians". We do not deal with these people. But we have to deal with them. They are part of our world. We have to find the way of dealing with diversity in the world. That is what international relations is about. FP is about dealing with the outside world. Foreign comes from the world "foris" (Latin meaning: "outside"). FP is about copying with differences, and it does not mean we should look down on people or treat them aggressively. It should be about creating conditions in which we can be different and respect each other's differences.

The third is the politics of implementation. If we know what we should do in FP, how do we achieve it? Which instruments should be used? Soft power, or hard power? What capabilities should we try to achieve at the national level? How much money should Spain spend on its defence or an overseas policy? In the last 20 years Japan and Italy have decided to spend a lot more money on development aid, not just because they worry about poverty and they want to help people. Japan because it is blocked on the military front. It is therefore expected to pay more through international negotiations. I was talking to somebody about fishing the other day and there are many technical fishing commissions, for tuna fishing or whales, for example, and the Japanese manage to get many more votes for the Japanese position because they give a lot of aid to very small poor countries. This is an useful strategy. Italy has also spent a lot more on development assistance. Why? Because they realized that Germany was going to become a member of the Security Council. Italy was extremely unhappy about Germany being chosen and Italy not. And one of the reasons why Germany was chosen was because it paid for other United Nations activities and Italy did not. So in the last 10 years Italy has spent more on ODA and the UN, despite its domestic financial problems and has contributed much more to peacekeeping operations. Italy is now, I think, the 4th biggest contributor to peacekeeping operations globally. So now its argument is so much stronger for the reform of the UN system, which would allow countries like Italy at least to have a rotating membership on the UN Security Council. So when we think about different instruments of FP, it is a more subtle and complex matter than at first appears.

Fourth is the politics of ethics, which I have talked about to some degree already. We do have to decide and therefore to use political arguments about, our different obligations to our neighbours, to people who simply happen to be geographically distant from us but may be in great need of help. Should we be more concerned about the Bosnians or the Rwandans or the Cambodians? They are all human beings, so what is the difference? Or do we have special obligations

because this is in our area? Or because we have a historical connection as Portugal with East Timor, as Britain does with Zimbabwe or Spain does with South America? Is past history a good basis for policy, and certainly, for an ethical FP? One of the most important developments in policy analysis in the last 20 years has been the arrival of the discussion of ethical FP's, which Tony Blair and Robin Cook boosted in 1997. But does this mean that previous governments pursued 'unethical' FP? Not many of us want to pursue an unethical FP, but what is the appropriate balance? And what kind of morals? And how to integrate morality with interest? And so on.

The politics of image, is my fifth category. This is a new element in FPA. Because countries are now more concerned to be like multinational cooperation, in that they want to establish their brand in international relations. You know that if you have a Volkswagen you have a very solid brand. And even though a Seat or a Skoda might be exactly the same car, it is much cheaper to buy but just as good, it does not have the Volkswagen badge on the front. So there are many people who will still buy the Volkswagen. Countries now realize the importance of branding and public relations. A very good example was Slovenia, a small country which wanted to make sure that it was in the lead in getting into the European Union, and it did not want to be seen as a dangerous, nasty, uncivilized people from the Balkans associated with genocide. So it used a brilliant public relations campaign to emphasize that it was like Austria. It was really Austria but slightly different, modern, sophisticated. This was very successful. Croatia is beginning to learn those same lessons now, but the Serbs still have not yet learnt.

You do not achieve everything through public relations; obviously there has to be something underneath the fine clothes. But it is still a necessary condition to have a FP with an attractive image. Blair did it too with "cool Britannia", he wanted to repackage Britain to mean not just the Britain of the Queen, the Changing of the Guard and Shakespeare. He wanted to have Britain seen as vibrant, a melting pot culture, a flexible economy Britain, a bridge between Europe and America. Of course, you can fool the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all the time.

Sub-national units are also concerned with image, as Jordi Vaquer i Fanès can tell us, arising from his work for the Catalan government. Other such sub-national actors are Cataluña or California or the city of London. Sometimes it is a matter of trade or tourist promotion, but at others it will have political implications, for example in cities seeking to hold the Olympics, like London,

Madrid, Paris...It is not just a question of sport, but of money and of politics and the projection of your city and country. For example, why does Madrid want the Olympics so soon after Barcelona's success?

The sixth kind of politics that FPA deals with is the politics of decision-making. How does the decision-making process work? Where does power lie?. As the American political scientist Robert Dahl asked: who governs? I have always been interested in the role of leadership, cabinets and bureaucracies in FP. Is there a hidden elite controlling these things? In Britain at the moment does Tony Blair control FP more than Jack Straw? In the USA we have watched the battle between Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld. What kind of internal politics decides these issues? Who produces the new ideas or initiatives which shape FP? Where do the US neo-conservatives come from? Who are they representing? Why do they hold the ideas that they do? Why have they managed to capture the American decision-making system so effectively? Is FP their big idea or is FP a consequence of the domestic ideas?

A final but crucial aspect of decision-making is democratic accountability. How is this possible in FP when people do not have enough knowledge, and so much is done in secret? After all, we need technical experts to operate FP. We know that in most democratic countries even parliamentary committees are weak in the area of FP. That in Britain is certainly dominated by the ruling party. The New Labour majority is just as strong in the Committees as in the House of Commons. On the whole the Committee tends to do the government's work instead of the parliament's work. In term of democracy should we move our work from parliament to the media? Should we expect the media to provide our way of opening up the FP process, giving us more information, more ways of embarrassing politicians and thus holding them into account? Or should we rely on you and me as in the power of the street? In London one and a half million people on the street demonstrated on 15 February 2003 against the war. It did not stop policy. Tony Blair felt he had to hold to his conscience and his responsibility to follow a particular line. This is the classic problem exposed 200 years ago, that democratic policy is not just about doing what people say, it is about doing something for the people.

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